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Abstract
This paper studies costs and benefits of institutional harmonisation in the context of
EU relations with its neighbors. The purpose of this paper is to outline the likely forms of
institutional harmonisation between the EU and its Eastern neighbors and provide an
overview of the methodologies that can be used in measuring its effects (costs and
benefits). This paper serves as a background for two measurement exercises – one on
benefits and another on costs – that are to be undertaken during the second stage of
research.
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This working paper contains the results of the first stage of research conducted
within the framework of the Workpackage #11 of the ENEPO project called “The
costs and benefits of institutional harmonisation”. Following the work package’s title,
the authors aim to identify the costs and benefits of institutional harmonisation
between the EU and its Eastern neighbors. 
The first stage of research, presented here, is devoted to the discussion of the
concept of institutional harmonisation, its application in the context of relations
between the EU and its Eastern neighbors, discussion of possible costs and benefits of
such harmonisation, and methods to measure the effects. This research serves as a
background for the second stage of the project which is devoted to measuring the costs
and benefits of institutional harmonisation between the EU and its Eastern neighbors.  
For the purposes of this paper the notion of “Eastern neighbors” (which we
abbreviate as EN countries) is understood as countries covered by the European
Neighborhood Policy plus Russia, i.e. we analyze Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. 
Chapter 1 begins with a brief discussion of the concept of institutions and
institutional harmonisation. Then it proceeds to an enquiry into what institutional
harmonisation between the EU and its neighbors may mean and what shape it may
take. Based on this analysis, assumptions about the shape of harmonisation are
developed (to be used in further analysis). This is followed by a brief discussion of
possible costs and benefits of the suggested path of harmonisation and some
methodological remarks on their measurement. In Chapter 2, limitations and
problems of institutional harmonisation are discussed. Chapter 3 is devoted to a
discussion of methodologies to measure the magnitude of non-tariff barriers (NTBs).
This analysis will be further used for estimating the benefits of institutional
harmonisation in the context of gaining improved market access. Chapter 4 discusses
methodologies to measure costs of institutional harmonisation and their empirical
estimates. The analyses in Chapters 3 and 4 serve as a background for the
development of respective models to measure costs and benefits during the second
stage of the research. 
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Introduction
1. Concept of institutional harmonisation and its applications to
European integration
1.1. What is institutional harmonisation?
It has become an established fact that institutions are an important factor of
economic performance of economies. Numerous empirical studies showed a positive
correlation between the level of development of institutions of countries and
performance of their economies across space and over time (the earliest and most
famous of them done by the Nobel Prize winner Douglass North (North, 1990)). 
The link between institutions and growth stems from the very notion of
institutions: according to North’s theory, they are formal rules, informal constraints,
and enforcement mechanisms that provide the basic structure by which human beings
create order and attempt to reduce uncertainty in exchange. By reducing uncertainty,
institutions help reduce transaction costs and, hence, the profitability and feasibility
of engaging in economic activity.
In the context of harmonisation within and with the EU, institutional
harmonisation can be considered as a part of Europeanization – a process of
internalization of European values and policy paradigms. It takes place within the EU
itself, as well as beyond its borders. Enlargement, for example, stimulated
Europeanization in the acceding states. The European Neighborhood policy attempts
to bring the same forces into play beyond EU frontiers. 
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Chapter 1.
Institutional harmonisation
and its costs and benefits
in the context of EU cooperation
with its neighbors
By Anna Kolesnichenko, CASE Ukraine
We would argue that the success of the institutional harmonisation can be measured
by the degree of Europeanization achieved, i.e. whether the changes have been
internalized. Simple mechanical replication of institutions that does not lead to their
internalization will not bring much benefit and might actually harm the “importing”
country. If the institutional changes are not internalized, the harmonisation can result
in the emergence of a large gap between the official institutions and unofficial ones. The
EU appreciates this challenge and tries to seek ways to increase local ownership of the
integration effort. In particular, in the Action Plans within the ENP it suggests the joint
setting of priorities and joint monitoring of reform performance.1
1.2. What institutional harmonisation with the EU may mean - lessons from
existing arrangements
In the economic domain, institutional harmonisation with the EU means adopting
the rules and policies that govern the EU economy. The highest degree of
harmonisation can be achieved by joining the EU; yet, other arrangements that
involve a certain degree of harmonisation are also possible. The existing
arrangements vary in their degree of integration and coverage. After membership in
the EU, the strongest degree of integration is achieved within the European Economic
Area (EEA), followed by EU-Swiss bilateral cooperation, the EU-Turkey Customs
Union and different free trade arrangements (such as the Euro-Mediterranean FTA or
FTA with Chile). In addition, there are examples of sectoral arrangements, such as
Mutual Recognition agreements in particular sectors. We will briefly discuss each
arrangement and try to draw lessons for neighbor countries. 
Option 1 – accession to the EU (membership)
Although this option is not realistic in the timeframe of our analysis, it is worth
discussing as a benchmark case as it represents the maximum of what can potentially
be attained. During accession negotiations for the 10 countries that joined the EU in
2004, the parties negotiated 31 chapters as a part of the accession. They included free
movement of goods, services, persons and capital, as well as company law,
competition policy, agriculture, fisheries, transport policy, taxation, economic and
monetary union, statistics, employment and social policy, energy policy and others. 
In the economic sphere, institutional harmonisation with the EU means, first of
all, adoption of the EU’s rules in the four domains of its internal market – goods,
services, capital and labor. Harmonisation and mutual recognition are the main
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1 Chapter 2 discusses the limitations of institutional harmonisation in the context of the ENP.
instruments here. Harmonisation means adopting EU acquis; while mutual
recognition means that states give each others’ laws and standards the same validity
as their own. In addition to harmonisation in the areas of the “four freedoms”, the
acceding states need to take on rules in other areas of the European common
market. For example, they must comply with EU competition acquis, and before
accession, the European Commission tests whether enterprises operating in the
candidate countries are accustomed to operating in an environment such as that of
the Community. 
It is clear that the scope and the depth of institutional harmonisation between the
EU and its Eastern neighbors will be smaller than in the case of accession states. In
some sectors, harmonisation can be deep, and in these cases it will be interesting to
look at accession countries’ experiences. Yet, in a number of sectors, no
harmonisation is likely to occur without the prospect of membership. It makes sense
then to return to a discussion of accession experiences once it is decided which
sectors will see deep harmonisation.   
Option 2 – European Economic Area 
The European Economic Area (EEA) is an example of institutional harmonisation
with the EU without membership. Currently, the EEA includes Iceland, Lichtenstein
and Norway. The EEA works on the basis of a multilateral agreement between EEA
members and the EU. According to the agreement, EEA members adopt all EU acquis
related to the functioning of the EU common market (with the exception of Fishery
Policy and Common Agricultural Policy). With regard to third countries, EEA states
are free to set their own tariffs and conduct their own trade policy (including anti-
dumping measures, or concluding mutual recognition agreements). 
The major disadvantage of this arrangement is a quite weak influence on EU
decision making (EEA countries can only participate in “decision shaping” through
consultations in working groups). Plus, adoption of the full body of the EU Common
market related acquis may be disadvantageous for some sectors2. Finally, adoption of
all EU acquis requires an advanced administrative and institutional capacity. On the
positive side, one can mention, of course, unimpeded access to the EU internal
market. EEA states also participate in a range of EU programs and institutions, for
example, standardization bodies.   
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2 The issue of sectoral coverage will be discussed later, yet at this point it is worth noting that it could be difficult
to avoid some losses in some sectors in any deal on integration/harmonisation with the EU. Thus far, the
“package approach” has been a major feature of European integration, that involved not only exchange of
one-sector concessions, but also cross-sectoral deals. The basic initial deal between France and Germany that
formed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) is the most evident example to this end.
Experience of EEA countries shows that one can fully participate in the EU
internal market without EU membership. Yet, it would be difficult for the EU Eastern
neighbors to fully adopt this model in the near future mainly due to the lack of
administrative capacity and also because their economies substantially differ from the
EU economy (both by level of development and structure) much more than the
economies of EEA countries. Yet, some elements of this model could be borrowed. For
example, neighbor countries could participate in standardization bodies in the areas
in which they aim for substantial harmonisation with the EU.  
Option 3 – EU-Switzerland cooperation 
EU-Swiss bilateral cooperation is based on a free trade agreement and a range of
sectoral agreements on the free movement of persons, elimination of technical
barriers to trade, public procurement, civil aviation, transport, agriculture, research
and others. Switzerland adopts EU’s acquis only in the sectors covered by agreements
plus related policies (public procurement, for example).  
Such a harmonisation “a la carte” has its obvious advantages, as partners may
choose sectors in which it is beneficial for them to have harmonized policies. At the
same time, it can pose problems, as it limits the scope for package deals that involve
concessions in different sectors and, thus, limits the scope for harmonisation. In order
to limit the “cherry-picking” by Switzerland, the EU introduced a so-called ‘guillotine
clause’ so that Switzerland cannot opt out of one agreement without having all others
suspended. Moreover, the limited scope of harmonisation does not ensure genuinely
free market access; for example, if competition policy is not fully harmonized (which
is the case in Switzerland), it leaves room for launching antidumping cases and
prohibiting market access. 
Despite all these limitations, however, Swiss authorities recently confirmed their
preference for continuing the cooperation based on bilateral sectoral agreements,
because they think at the moment this option is the most efficient in promoting Swiss
interests (Swiss Integration Office, 2006). This approach, based on the search for best
options of promotion of state interests, as opposed to a search for the optimal shape
of integration, could be very useful in the case of EN countries, as it helps to focus on
the substance and purpose, rather than form of integration and harmonisation. 
To summarize, the Swiss model of cooperation could be attractive to neighbors
because of its selective nature. At the same time, their interests in relations with the
EU may be different from those of Switzerland. For example, for EN countries
institutional harmonisation with the EU may serve as a road to modernisation; in such
a case, it could be in their interest to have more comprehensive harmonisation. In
12
Anna Kolesnichenko, Veliko Dimitrov, Vladimir Dubrovskiy, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
CASE Reports No. 75/2007
particular, adopting EU horizontal policies in areas such as competition can stimulate
important market reforms in these countries. Therefore, in defining the scope and the
depth of their institutional harmonisation with the EU, one of the major parameters
should be the extent to which each particular measure helps in the reform and
modernisation of their economies. 
Option 4 – EU-Turkey Customs Union
Another option that Eastern neighbors could contemplate is a customs union (CU)
with the EU. A CU means full trade liberalization accompanied by an application of a
single external tariff. To date, the EU has only one such agreement with a non-
member country – Turkey3. According to the agreement, the two parties eliminated
tariff and non-tariff barriers to each other’s industrial goods, and Turkey adopted the
Community's Common Customs Tariff for imports from third countries. However, the
customs union does not cover agriculture (except processed agricultural products),
services and public procurement. Turkey harmonized its legislation in the areas of the
protection of intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights, competition,
state aid, public procurement and taxation, as well as settlement rights and services
with that of the EU. The decision on implementing the customs union contains quite
detailed prescriptions on what parts of the acquis should be adopted (or with which
the Turkish legislation should comply) and when. 
The record of implementation of the CU agreement shows mixed results. On the one
hand, as Ulgen and Zahariadis (2004) ague, it helped to transform Turkish industry by
introducing stronger competition, which led to improvements in productivity, and
changed the structure of Turkish industry through its integration in international
production and distribution networks. Furthermore, it helped to modernize Turkey’s
economic legislation, which also facilitated creation of a favorable business climate. 
On the other hand, a customs union has important downsides. First is the possibility
of trade diversion. In the case of Turkey, this does not seem to have been the case, as
Ulgen and Zahariadis (2004) argue. Yet, other countries should carefully consider the
possibility of such an effect of the CU. Second, Turkey has no influence on its tariff policy
and has to follow the trade policy of the EU. For example, it had to conclude free trade
agreements with all third states with which the EU had FTAs. In the case of a CU with a
partner as large as the EU, the situation is exacerbated by the very unequal character of
the relationship, as the EU does not adjust its trade policy to Turkey’s interests. 
All these limitations make it difficult to recommend a CU as a suitable
arrangement for EN countries. The most important argument in their case is that the
13
INSTITUTIONAL HARMONIZATION IN THE CONTEXT...
CASE Reports No. 75/2007
3 To be exact, the EU has other two CU agreements – with Andorra and San Marino, European microstates.
majority of them carry out a significant amount of trade with non-EU countries (very
often between themselves, and particularly with Russia), so that trade diversion could
bring substantial losses. At the same time, it is instructive to look at the Turkish case
because of the similarity of its level of institutional development with that of the EN
countries. Unlike EEA countries, which are able to adopt all economic acquis and get
full market access, Turkey represents the case of a partner with less developed
institutions that not only faces the challenge of adopting EU economic requirements,
but also diverse challenges of development and economic modernisation. 
The first lesson from the Turkish experience is that harmonisation of standards is
not enough to gain market access; what is also important is conformity assessment.
Ulgen and Zahariadis (2004), for example, show that Turkish products often face
difficulties entering the EU market due to a lack of conformity assessment, which
arises due to weaknesses in the Turkish certification and accreditation system and,
consequently, lack of trust on the part of the EU. 
Second, despite adoption of EU product standards and different trade-related
acquis, Turkey is not saved from EU antidumping investigations and other trade
defense measures. According to the CU agreement, application of these instruments
can be suspended if the EU-Turkey Association Council finds that Turkey has
implemented competition, state aid control and other relevant parts of the acquis
related to the internal market and ensured their effective enforcement (European
Commission, 1995). As with the conformity assessment, Turkey is not there yet.  
Third, it is important to ensure that the depth and coverage of market access is
beneficial for both parties. For example, the EU-Turkey customs union does not cover
agriculture and services, which substantially limits the benefit of the CU for Turkey. 
Finally, the Turkish case also shows that it is better not to build economic
cooperation on political assumptions: i.e. Turkey considered the CU as a stepping
stone to EU membership. Yet, the road to EU membership appears to be rather long
(and still not secure), and at the same time Turkey has had to bear different economic
and political costs of the CU.  
To summarize, it is difficult to advise creation of a customs union with the EU for
EN countries due to serious drawbacks of this arrangement, first of all, the possibility
of trade diversion. At the same time, useful lessons could be drawn from the Turkish
experience. On the one hand, it shows that the CU did stimulate harmonisation and
reform of the Turkish economy in line with EU requirements. At the same time, weak
institutional capacity prevented Turkey from fully enjoying the benefits from such an
arrangement (for example, due to a lack of conformity assessment). Other limitations
of the arrangement - the possibility of imposition of antidumping duties, exclusion of
important sectors (agriculture and services) from the arrangement - further weakened
its positive effect. These shortcomings are not necessarily features of the customs
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union per se, yet they could be instructive for the EU’s Eastern neighbors for shaping
their economic agreements with the EU. 
Option 5 – Free trade area (FTA)
The EU has a multiplicity of FTAs: in addition to the EEA, it has been advancing
FTAs with developing countries in the Middle East, North Africa, Latin America, the
Caribbean and other regions. The most interesting, from the point of view of EN
countries, could be the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA), as it applies
to another group of EU neighbors. Creation of the EMFTA is a part of the Barcelona
process – the process of cooperation and integration between the EU and the
Mediterranean countries. The EMFTA does not exist yet – its creation should be
completed by 2010. Currently, countries participating in the process have association
agreements with the EU that define the mechanisms of completing the EMFTA. 
Compared to other forms of cooperation and integration, an FTA is the weakest
in terms of the depth and scope of institutional harmonisation. In the case of
Mediterranean countries, Association agreements provide only for liberalization of
trade in manufactured goods, but not in services or agriculture. Empirical estimates
show that liberalization in agriculture in Euromed countries could bring between 0
and 0.5% of GDP (IARC, 2006). The small magnitude of the effect stems mainly from
the expected shrinkage of the agricultural sector in Euromed countries, partly
because of stronger competition from subsidized imports from the EU. As for the
services sector, welfare gains from liberalization are estimated at approximately the
same magnitude – at about 1% of GDP; yet, due to the effect on FDI and a
stimulating effect on domestic reforms, services liberalization could bring benefits
many times larger (up to 50% of GDP) (IARC, 2006). It was only recently that the
EU and its Mediterranean partners started to advance the agenda of liberalization
in agricultural products and services4.
The depth of harmonisation envisaged by the Euromed Association agreements is also
insignificant: unlike in the EU-Turkey customs union agreement, Euromed agreements
do not have any requirements for adopting EU acquis, except for rules of origin. Also,
provisions on state aid, competition and other horizontal issues have a declarative
character. An advance on these issues is made in the Action Plans in the ENP framework,
which, for example, set a clear agenda for harmonisation of product standards (through
implementation by Euromed partners of the Agreement on Conformity Assessment and
Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA)), and also contain quite detailed and concrete
provisions on customs, state aid and competition policy. 
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4 See, for example, Euromed (2005).
The main conclusion that one may draw from the Mediterranean countries’
experience is that gains from a simple FTA limited to liberalization of trade in goods
are going to be limited, and EN partners should consider “enhanced” types of
agreements. In particular, they could investigate the possibilities and possible effects
of liberalization of trade in services and agriculture. 
Conclusions on other countries experience
• Based on the review of some lessons from the existing arrangements, one can
conclude that EN countries should opt for a wider integration agreement than
just liberalization of trade in manufactured goods and consider other sectors. 
• Harmonisation should be based on the realistic assessment of integration
options, and not assumptions. It should also focus on achieving the interest of
EN countries and not so much on the name and design of the integration model. 
• Transposition of EU standards into national legislation does not give automatic
market access; they also need to be effectively implemented. 
• The sectoral approach could be attractive, as it offers flexibility; yet it also poses
limits on integration. 
• A customs union is stronger in promoting institutional harmonisation than an
FTA, yet its drawbacks make it an unattractive option for EN countries. 
1.3. Options for institutional harmonisation of EU Eastern Neighbors
The institutional harmonisation in the neighboring countries with the EU is going
to be driven by the agenda of facilitating market access, especially in the goods sector,
and integration in infrastructure sectors, notably energy and transport. Some
integration is also likely in certain service sectors (first of all, financial and telecom
services), and possibly, to a much smaller extent, in agriculture.  
The absence of a membership prospective for the EU neighbors is likely to limit the
degree of institutional harmonisation of these countries with the EU compared to that
achieved in the case of accession. The impossibility of acceding to certain institutions
and insufficient leverage are two broad reasons that will limit the degree and scope of
integration and its effects. For example, neighbor countries will not be able to
participate in EU institutions such as the Council and the European Commission
(although some observatory status is perhaps possible). At the same time, it would be
difficult for the EU to impose conditionality on these countries comparable to that it
was able to apply to the accession countries. The promise of full integration in the EU
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has legitimized the EU’s demands on adoption of its norms and institutions by
acceding countries. It is not going to be the case with the neighboring countries;
rather, their integration with the EU will be selective in terms of coverage and will be
based on mutual benefit in each particular field. 
The current debate on the prospects of integration and cooperation between the EU
and its Eastern neighbors falls within the framework of the European Neighborhood
Policy (ENP). The ENP was developed in 2004 with the general objective of avoiding
the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors. The
ENP covers all of the EU’s Eastern neighbors, except Russia, and ten Mediterranean
countries. Russia refused to join the ENP, but develops its relationship with the EU
through a Strategic Partnership covering four “common spaces”. 
The official economic objective of the ENP is to help the neighbors develop and
modernize their economies by anchoring them to the European model of economic
governance. The EU proposes doing so by creating enhanced FTAs and extending access
to the EU internal market to its neighbors and undertaking deep integration in several
sectors, first of all, energy and transport. The key promise of the ENP is that economic
integration can go beyond free trade in goods and include “behind the border” issues:
eliminating non-tariff barriers and progressively achieving comprehensive convergence
in trade and regulatory areas such as technical norms and standards, sanitary and
phytosanitary measures, rules of origin, customs procedures, and others. 
ENP Action Plans have been the main instruments guiding the implementation of the
ENP. The EU concluded them with all Eastern neighbors except Belarus, with which
cooperation is limited due to the undemocratic regime in the country. In its recent
communication on the ENP, the European Commission states that “over time, the
implementation of the ENP Action Plans, particularly on regulatory areas, will prepare
the ground for the conclusion of a new generation of deep and comprehensive Free
Trade Agreements (FTA) with all ENP partners”5. These FTAs will cover a substantial
part of trade in goods and services, including sectors important for ENP countries, and
will include strong legally-binding provisions on trade and economic regulatory issues6.
Action Plans for EU Eastern Neighbors envisage the following with regard to
institutional harmonisation:  
As the above summary of provisions demonstrates, the harmonisation agenda is
quite wide in scope and encompasses all major horizontal policy areas. The depth of
harmonisation, however, differs, with the highest demands for standards of industrial
products, SPS and competition policy. 
The second major route for neighbors’ engagement is sectoral integration. The
analysis of Action Plans suggests that transport and energy will see the deepest degree
17
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5 European Commission (2006), p. 4.
6 Ibid.
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Table 1.1. Key provisions on institutional harmonisation in the economic domain as defined
in ENP Action Plans for EU Eastern Neighbors
Trade general Exploration of possibilities for establishment of a free trade agreement
Horizontal issues:
Customs Harmonisation and simplification of customs legislation and procedures
Trade in EU
harmonized areas
Adoption of European and international legislative and administrative
practices for standards, technical regulations and conformity assessment
in EU harmonized areas, especially in priority sectors of cooperation
for both parties
Trade in EU
non-harmonized
areas
Elimination of discrimination in EU non-harmonized areas, increasing
information exchange 
SPS
Modernisation of SPS through: adoption of WTO requirements on SPS,
gradual convergence with EU practices
Company law
and establishment
Convergence and effective implementation of key principles of company
law, accounting and auditing with international and EU rules and standards
Services Gradual liberalisation of trade in selected service sectors
Movement
of capital Ensuring the free movement of capital related to direct investment
Movement
of workers
Abolishing discrimination towards migrant workers as regards working
conditions, remuneration or dismissal
Taxation
Developing the tax system in accordance with general EU and international
principles
Competition
policy
Convergence with EU principles on competition, in particular through
establishing full transparency of state aid, increase in capacity
and independence of competition authorities
Intellectual
and industrial
property rights
(IPR)
Ensuring full conformity of IPR legislation with TRIPS and its effective
enforcement; development of cooperation with EU law enforcement
bodies in field of IPR
Public
procurement
Ensuring compliance of the public procurement system with EU
procurement legislation and principles, in particular transparency,
information provision, access to legal recourse, and awareness,
as well as limited use of exceptions 
Statistics Adoption of statistical methods fully compatible with European standards
Sectors:
Transport
Approximation of legislative and regulatory frameworks with European
and international standards, in particular for safety and security
(all transport modes); co-operation in satellite navigation; conclusion
of agreements on air services with the EU;  development
of the Pan-European Corridors and Areas
Energy
Energy policy convergence towards EU energy policy objectives; gradual
convergence towards the principles of the EU internal electricity
and gas markets
Information
Society
and media
Adoption of audiovisual legislation in full compliance with European
standards with a view to future participation in international instruments
of the Council of Europe in the field of media; approximate digital
television and audio broadcasting to European standards
Environment
No exact  requirements on convergence, but demands to ensure
that conditions for good environmental governance
are set and implemented; enhance co-operation on environmental issues
Science 
and technology,
R&D
Encourage integration into the European Research Area and into
Community R&D Framework Programs
of integration and harmonisation in the near future. EU neighbors can potentially go
as far as full integration in the European energy and transport networks. Most
importantly, there is a strong mutual interest in integration in these sectors: in
particular, in the energy sector, integration would allow enhancing energy security
for both the EU and its neighbors. The EU is also interested in integration in the
aviation sector to gain better market access in the ENP countries7, while the latter
hope it will help upgrade the sector and attract investment in it. As in the case with
market access of goods, the most important effect of integration in these sectors for
the neighbor countries is going to be the stimulus for internal liberalization and
reform of these sectors that the integration will demand. 
The EU’s partnership with Russia is developed within the framework of the
“Common European Economic Space” that was agreed on at the Russian-European
summit in May 2002. At the St.Petersburg Summit in May 2003, the EU and Russia
decided to develop four common spaces: a common economic space; a common space
for freedom, security and justice; a space for cooperation for external security; and a
space for joint research and education. At the Moscow Summit in May 2005, a
package of Road Maps was adopted that outline the actions necessary to implement
the common spaces. The general provisions of the common economic space (CES) are
similar to the provisions of the ENP Action Plans, but are put in different wording.
The major difference is that it does not speak of Russia’s adopting EU’s acquis, but
rather about “dialogue” and “approximation”. So, the Road Map on the CES, is
concerned with the creation of an “integrated market”. As with ENP countries, the
CES includes proposals on creation of common networks in several sectors:
telecommunications, transport, energy, space and environment. Cooperation in the
energy sector is likely to be a priority. 
1.4. Proposed institutional harmonisation package for EU Eastern neighbors
Based on the provisions of the ENP documents, specifics of the EU Eastern
neighbors and drawing on the lessons of other countries, we suggest that institutional
harmonisation between the EU and its neighbors in the medium term will involve the
following:
• FTA in industrial products, involving full harmonisation of product standards
and regulation in EU harmonized areas and adoption of a Mutual Recognition
agreement in non-harmonized areas;
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7 The Action Plans, in particular, suggest possible joining by Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia of the European
Joint Aviation Authorities. The EU has also concluded in March 2007 an aviation agreement with Russia that
provides for elimination of Siberian overflight charges starting from 2013.
• Partial liberalization of trade in agricultural products (in sectors that are able to
comply with EU SPS requirements);
• Partial liberalization of trade in services. The service sector in EN countries
constitutes between 32% and 60% of GDP (Table 1.2), which means that
liberalization in services trade can have strong economic effects. 
• Integration in EU energy and transport networks. 
2. Effects of institutional harmonisation 
The experience of previous integration initiatives, both in the EU and in other parts
of the world, could give insights into what to expect from institutional harmonisation
in the EU neighboring states. This chapter starts with an overview of the theoretical
underpinnings on the impact of institutional harmonisation on the performance of the
economies, to which examples from empirical studies have been added. The focus of
the analysis is on the effects for countries that import institutions, i.e. countries that
integrate with the EU. The analysis begins with a description of benefits from
institutional harmonisation and then turns to costs. 
2.1. Benefits 
There are different channels through which institutional harmonisation with the
EU is going to benefit a country. The most important of them are: 
• better market access
• increased investment 
• increased competition
• reduced corruption
The ultimate result of all these effects is higher economic efficiency and welfare. 
20
Anna Kolesnichenko, Veliko Dimitrov, Vladimir Dubrovskiy, Iryna Orlova, Svitlana Taran
CASE Reports No. 75/2007
Source: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/datapdf.htm
Table 1.2. Composition of GDP, %, 2004
  Agriculture Industry Services
Armenia 25,4 39,1 35,6
Azerbaijan 13,5 54,3 32,2
Belarus 15,7 38,3 46,1
Georgia (2003) 20,5 25,5 54,1
Moldova 23,4 21,4 55,2
Russia (2003) 5,2 34,2 60,7
Ukraine 13,7 40,1 46,3
1) Improved market access
Institutional harmonisation, especially in the economic sphere, will improve the
mutual market access between the EU and the partner country. This effect comes due to
the reduction in non-tariff barriers as a result of harmonisation in economic regulations
and standards. In the case of European integration this means harmonisation of the
partner country’s institutional settings with the requirements of the European internal
market. These include product standards and regulations, competition and state aid
policy, and other areas regulated by the EU’s acquis. Once a partner country harmonizes
these areas with EU requirements, its companies can freely sell goods in the EU market.
To its turn, better market access brings efficiency gains that promote growth. 
Lejour et al (2001) distinguishes two channels through which market access can
have a positive effect on economic efficiency and growth. One channel is through
better exploitation of comparative advantage, when better market access (through the
removal of NTBs) leads to a change in relative prices and, therefore, makes prices
more informative of real comparative advantages of countries, thus encouraging a
more efficient trade pattern; this, in turn, leads to economic growth. The second effect
works through the change in terms of trade for both partners due to the removal of
the loss that the NTB generated (unlike tariffs, NTBs do not generate income to any
parties involved and are a pure efficiency loss). According to estimations by Lejour et
al (2001), improvement of access of CEE countries to the EU market leads to a 5-9%
GDP welfare improvement in CEE. Maliszewska (2004) obtained a similar result – 3-
7% GDP. There exist a range of other estimates of effects from better market access
through the removal of NTBs, which are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
2) Increased investment 
The estimated efficiency and growth gains from the institutional harmonisation
are going to be larger if one incorporates its dynamic effect, in particular, on
investment. First, institutional harmonisation makes the environment in the partner
country more familiar to investors. Secondly, as the quality of imported institutions
will be better than of old domestic ones (as we assumed for ENP countries), the
business environment will become more hospitable to investors. For example, a
successful adoption of EU norms on property rights or competition is likely to
substantially increase the attractiveness of ENP economies for investment. Thirdly,
the effect of “tying hands”, as discussed above, increases credibility and stability of
government policies. All these effects result in the reduction of the risk premium and,
thus, of interest rates. A lower risk premium will attract risk-averse investors and will
also bring efficiency gains due to higher certainty. Furthermore, the reduction in
interest rates will make investment more affordable. All these effects will stimulate
capital accumulation and growth.    
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According to their estimates, CEE countries were going to gain between 1.5 and
18.8% depending on assumptions about the investment risk reduction (in a more
optimistic scenario integration into the EU market led to a reduction of the risk
premium in the CEE).
Baldwin et al (1997) estimated for the CEE that the effect from the reduced risk
premium would increase the welfare gain from 1.5% (obtained due to the elimination
of all trade barriers and adoption of a common external tariff) to 18.8%  (this result is
obtained under the assumption that the risk premium decreases by 15%). CEPS
(2006, p. 72) estimates for Ukraine give about a 4-5% welfare improvement from the
reduced cost of capital (CEPS estimates the fall in the risk premium at 17%).    
3) Increased credibility of reforms and certainty in the economy
The credibility of reforms is a major condition necessary for their success. If
economic agents do not believe the announced reform plans, they will not adjust their
economic behavior accordingly, and thus, the reform will not have the desired effect.
The credibility problem arises either when the government’s policies are inconsistent
or when the government’s motives are unclear; when the anticipated political costs of
the policies are high; and finally, when the macroeconomic environment is unstable
(Rodrik, 1989, as cited in Piazolo, 1999). The literature suggests several strategies to
deal with the credibility problem: to signal commitment, to change governmental
incentives and to reduce the scope of governmental maneuvering. 
Integration with a more advanced partner, such as the European Union, can help
enhance the credibility of reforms. In particular, Piazolo (1999) argues that
integration with an advanced partner such as the EU gives an opportunity to use all
of the above mentioned strategies to improve credibility. First, commitment to
integrate serves as a signal of a government that limits the scope of its maneuver,
including deviation from reforms. Second, integration involves obligations that
reduce the possibility of arbitrary changes of policies. Finally, integration may change
the incentive structure of the government (i.e. when integration brings valuable
benefits to the government), so that it becomes reluctant to deviate.    
A similar argument is developed by Whalley (1996), namely that the objectives of
the countries that seek regional integration are not limited to economic gains from
trade, but also include a multiplicity of other goals, including securing irreversibility
of reforms.  For example, according to Whalley (1996), it was not so much market
access, as the need to secure the irreversibility of reforms that was behind Mexico’s
negotiations of NAFTA. 
Previous enlargements of the EU can provide insights on how these effects
operate. In the process of accession of CEE countries, the Europe Agreements served
as guides for implementing domestic reforms and advancing the integration agenda.
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A failure to comply with them could substantially delay the integration process, which
was regarded as very undesirable by the acceding countries. In such a way, the
Europe Agreements served as a powerful reform catalyst and a disciplinarian device.
The accession of Romania and Bulgaria confirms the very strong effect of accession
to the EU on the credibility of domestic policies. In 2005, the EU began talking of
postponement of accession of these countries, as they had not reformed sufficiently;
the EU was especially concerned about the pervasive corruption. The fear of such a
delay prompted the Bulgarian and Romanian governments to intensify their efforts. 
4) Increased competition
Integration into the European market and the accompanying institutional
harmonisation can spur competition in the economy. This effect lay at the core of the
original idea of the EU common market. The positive effect on competition comes
through trade liberalization, as a common market demands the removal of protective
trade barriers and exposes companies to strong competition from other companies in
the united market. Also, adoption of EU competition and state aid rules is going to
have pro-competitive effects. Finally, integration and harmonisation with the EU can
help the government overcome domestic protectionist pressures by referring to the
need to comply with the demands of integration. Finally, competition promotes
efficiency and growth (although there are still many unresolved questions in the
empirical research on the effect of competition on growth8).   
5) Reduction in corruption
Related to the concept of “tied hands” is another effect from harmonisation with
the EU – reduction in corruption. The restrictions that harmonisation imposes leave
less room for discretionary interpretation of rules and, thus, decrease opportunities
for corruption. Moreover, increased competition due to freer trade reduces monopoly
rents and, therefore, removes incentives for companies to bribe politicians. There are
a large number of studies that show that corruption undermines the effectiveness of
investment and slows down the long-term growth of an economy9.
Concluding remarks on benefits
As the above overview suggests, the ultimate result of the work of the above effects
is an increase in efficiency of resource use and, thus, in productivity and growth.
Therefore, an additional boost to economic growth can serve as the main measure of
the effect of institutional harmonisation. 
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8 See Aghion and Griffith (2005) for a good overview of different studies and an attempt to reconcile them.   
9 It has many other negative effects, such as aggravation of poverty and inequality (as it hurts the poor the most),
reducing aid efficiency, threatening security etc.
2.2. Costs 
Institutional harmonisation of neighbors with the EU may involve some costs.
Harmonisation in the economic domain – adaptation of standards, policies and
regulations – will require companies to make additional investments and the
government to conduct a lot of work on harmonisation of legislation and its
implementation. 
The assessment of the costs of harmonisation is a very difficult exercise, both
conceptually and technically. The major methodological difficulty lies, as with the
assessment of benefits, in separating the effect of integration from the effect of the
general reform and modernisation effort. Another difficulty is the definition of the
cost. For example, whether expenses on improvement in product safety should be
considered as a cost or as an investment Or whether compliance with higher
environmental standards should be treated as a cost or as investment? From a
long-term prospective, many expenses on improvement of product safety,
environmental quality, administrative procedures and the like are not costs, but
rather investments, as they lead to improvement of the economic environment and
quality of life. Therefore, a more appropriate name for the “costs” would be
“investment in the short run”. These should be clearly separated from costs that
emerge due to unproductive losses.   
There were some attempts to estimate the costs of compliance in the CEE
countries in the course of their accession to the EU. The cost of compliance in the
agricultural sector was especially high. So, in Poland the cost of dairy sector
adjustment were estimated at PLN 15.5 bn (EUR 3.7 bn) in 1999 (CEN, 2003, p. 126);
the investment in the area of environment – at EUR 30.4 bn (Ibid p. 155)10. The total
cost of compliance in the agricultural sector in Poland and Lithuania was estimated
at 2-2.5% of GDP (CEPS, 2006, p. 89). 
In order to help accession countries to make the adjustments, the EU provided a
lot of institutional and financial help. In the case of neighbor countries, the amount of
support is likely to be substantially lower. Therefore, in their harmonisation effort
with the EU they should carefully calculate costs and weigh them against the expected
benefits in order to shape and schedule their harmonisation effort accordingly.  
Chapter 4 discusses the costs of institutional harmonisation and the ways to
measure them in more detail.
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10 At the same time, it is expected that by 2020 the accumulated benefits from improvement of environmental
standards will accrue to EUR 41- 208 bn (mainly due to improved health of the population).
3. Note on quantifying the effects from institutional harmonisation
Measuring the effects of institutional harmonisation is a challenging task. The
major methodological difficulty lies in separating the effects of institutional
harmonisation from the effects of the general reform effort and modernisation that
would take place anyway. To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies that
suggest a methodology for disentangling these two effects. What the existing studies
do is seperate the impact of the quality of institutions on growth in general. The most
frequently applied method for measuring the effects of integration, including
harmonisation of institutions, is the Computable-General Equilibrium (CGE) model.
To assess the impact of institutional harmonisation institutional variables are
translated into tariff equivalents. 
Another methodological difficulty lies in the very broad spectrum of effects from
institutional harmonisation, not all of which are easily measurable. Yet, as the
overview of the effects in the previous section suggests, many of them do impact
economic growth and welfare one way or another. Therefore, growth in welfare could
be considered as a general indicator of the effect of institutional change. 
The limited nature of neighbors’ integration with the EU also poses some
methodological challenges, as it means partial harmonisation. This necessitates making
some assumptions as to the degree and the coverage of harmonisation. For the purposes
of our analysis we assume that harmonisation will be the most advanced in the
economic domain, which is, in fact, what the EU itself has announced, i.e. that
economic integration will be the priority area of the ENP. The second major assumption
concerns the degree and form of the integration – namely, that it is going to be the
movement towards full market access in the majority of economic sectors. This
assumption is also based on the already disclosed plans of the EU and its ENP partners. 
In sum, for the purposes of measuring the effects of the institutional harmonisation
of the Eastern neighbors with the EU, we will concentrate on the welfare and growth
effects stemming from improved market access. The estimation of costs of
harmonisation will be based on the same assumptions. 
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“Critically important, the same institution will operate differently in an open access
order than in a limited access order. … Since institutions are made up of rules,
behavior patterns, and shared beliefs, the same observable rules may have very
different outcomes if the behavior and beliefs associated with them are different. …
the fact that the same institution may work differently in a limited and open access
social order provides a fundamental insight into the transition process.”
(North et al., 2006).
At the beginning of the transition in the former Soviet block there was a
widespread belief that “importing” of modern Western institutions (understood mostly
as formal rules, organizational structures, and so forth) augmented with “capacity
building” and extensive advisory aid would result in a well-functioning democracy
and market economy. The record has been mixed so far. While the policies were
mostly successful in the Eastern European aspirants for EU membership, the
experience of CIS countries is less convincing. Very often, importation of foreign
formal institutions did not produce the expected results and was even sometimes
counter-productive. In this chapter we try to find out what is special about CIS
countries that makes institutional harmonisation with Western models so difficult and
what can be done to deal with these peculiarities, in particular, in the context of their
relations with the EU. 
2.1. Some theoretical underpinnings
A recent work by North et al (2005, 2006) provides a very insightful and
convenient framework for analysing development in general and transition in
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Chapter 2.
Possible problems with institutional
harmonisation and the ways
of overcoming them
By Vladimir Dubrovsky, CASE Ukraine
particular. We think this approach very clearly demonstrates the nature of the
problems CIS countries face in their development. 
According to North et al. (2005, 2006), all contemporary states can be classified into
two fundamentally different groups. In the first one, a ruling coalition preserves its power
through paternalism, namely granting various players rents in exchange for political
support and abstaining from violence. This kind of social order is called a “limited
access” one, since rents can only be generated and preserved through some limitations
on entry. The second kind of social order is called “open access”, because it is based on
political and economic competition. Of course, in any real-world state both of these
arrangements are present to a certain extent. What makes a difference is their balance.
But, most importantly for our purposes, the same formal institutions may work
differently depending on the fundamental balance between an “open access social order”
and a “limited access social order” characteristic to a particular country. Therefore, the
key question of effective (not only formal, but de-facto) institutional harmonisation
becomes how to achieve the transition from a limited access to an open access order. 
North et al. (2005, 2006) show that the limited access order has been the prevailing
mode of social organization for thousands of years, and it was only in the 17th-18th
centuries that open access societies began to emerge in Western Europe. The process
was gradual, and economic and political opening went hand in hand. According to the
authors, the key to transition has been the impersonalisation of exchanges among
elites, which became possible due to the emergence of the rule of law for elites (so that
elites respected obligations based on their allegiance to an organization). Other pre-
conditions of transition involved perpetual forms of organizations for elites (i.e.
emergence of an organization as a legal entity) and political control of the military.
Once these preconditions are met, the success of transition depends on the existence
of civil society (i.e. the number and variety of organizations) and is supported by
competition in the economic domain. 
Based on the North et al. classification, we can infer that EU Member States have
an open access order, while CIS countries have strong elements of a limited access
order (of course, with variation from one country to another). Therefore, the
institutional harmonisation of Eastern neighbors with the EU, in fact, represents a
transition from one order (limited access) to another (open access), and it is in this
context that we will try to analyse the challenges and solutions for harmonisation.  
2.2. Institutional and societal peculiarities of the CIS
Historically, the Russian Empire, the USSR, and later the CIS countries have
managed to preserve a limited access order despite the importing and formal
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implementation of modern European institutions. Specific institutional and societal
arrangements that have emerged in the process of such an adjustment are remarkably
persistent. They can potentially adjust other kinds of new institutions in a similar way
that would de-facto preserve limited access despite formal changes, therefore making
the reforms ineffective or fake. In this chapter we will briefly describe these
phenomena that are, in our opinion, characteristic (although not necessarily unique)
to the CIS countries, and can essentially affect institutional harmonisation
1. “Soft” rule of law. It means discretionary implementation of (often impracticable)
legislation. There is an aphorism of the 19th century Russian historian Karamsin
that has become a sort of proverb in the Russian Empire, and then in the USSR
and succeeding countries: “the severity of the Russian laws is mitigated by their
optional (i.e. discretionary) enforcement”. As long as there are no means for
punishing all of the breakers of impracticable legislation, it is enforced arbitrarily,
at the discretion of a government official. Moreover, soft rule of law puts every
person or firm that is subject to a certain law or regulation into discretion of that
official, thus generating potential for rents. Yet, rich people or those with
connections can reduce their “costs of compliance” by using their capital and ties,
which only reinforces the limited nature of the social order. Soft rule of law,
therefore, supports the limited-access order and its most prominent feature in CIS
countries.  
2. Limited access order is interconnected with a weak civil society and generally low
social capital. As Putnam et al. (1993) pointed out, any kind of personal
discretionary power tends to crowd out social capital, since it provides people with
alternative ways of settling the issues. For example, people in Southern Italy while
being used to patron-client relationships lack social capital, which prevents local
democratic institutions from working as effectively as those in Northern Italy.
Many kinds of modern institutions that are likely to be imported in the process of
harmonisation imply civil mechanisms that are supposed to complement, support,
or check the correspondent state institutes. For example, the policy of
decentralization of governance is usually motivated with an assumption that the
people can better control and scrutinize local authorities, thus decentralization
should improve transparency. However, this is true only provided the social
capital is high enough. In CIS countries it is not necessarily the case. 
3. Yet another important societal peculiarity is a persistence of reputation-based
interpersonal networks of reciprocal exchange with “favors of access” - “blat”
networks that penetrated Soviet society (Ledeneva, 1998). They have emerged as
an essentially informal institutional arrangement able to reduce the transaction
costs of illegal (but still not illegitimate) exchange. Under the prevailing extortion
such networks appear as a necessary defensive strategy that the people use to
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protect their interests from ‘vlast’ (discretionary administrative power). However,
once emerged as a means for protection of contracts independent from the law,
such networks may equally serve to circumvent any kind of legislation and to
conduct any kind of unlawful deals. Therefore, they eventually undermine and
crowd out the rule of law necessary for a market economy (Litwack, 1991).
Taken together, these interrelated phenomena cast serious doubts on whether the
new rules imported in the process of institutional harmonisation with the EU can be
implemented properly, work effectively, and not further help in maintaining a limited
access order. In particular, while planning harmonisation initiatives, one should be
aware that:
• the bureaucracy is far from being “Weberian”. It is often unable to implement
new restrictions in a proper way, while both the people and state officials
possess (and inherited) vast experience in circumventing or ignoring excessively
restrictive regulations; 
• governments in CIS countries serve primary elites, not the population;
correspondingly, they resist implementation of certain kinds of modern
institutions;
• despite formal “openness”, new entry and competition can be restricted in some
informal ways, so the liberalization is partly or fully offset. Moreover, privileges
can erode the effectiveness of formal restrictions; 
• people may be unready to use the opportunities provided by the “open access”
institutions –  democracy and the market.   
As a result, the attempts to impose new formal institutions may even sometimes
have a perverse effect and help further solidify informal institutions of the limited
access order, further weaken the rule of law and social capital, further corrupt the
bureaucracy, and strengthen informal social arrangements for unlawful transactions.
2.3. Risks to harmonisation as demonstrated by previous experiences
Past experiences of introduction of Western institutions in the now CIS countries
could be instructive of what to expect from institutional harmonisation with the EU.
One of the major lessons from the past is that attempts at implementation of
exogenously designed formal institutions may be counter-productive if they create or
amplify the gap between formal and informal institutions. This happens, for instance,
when the practices that were tolerated or even prized suddenly become persecuted;
or some new rules and practices that have not grown up within the society suddenly
get imposed; or previously punishable practices become legalized while still perceived
by many people as illegitimate. Such attempts took place many times, of which we
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take as examples the Petrovian reforms in the early 18th century in Russia; the
Bolsheviks policies in the USSR in the 1920s; and the tax reform of 1997 in Ukraine,
which has brought about complications that have been quite typical for CIS countries
as a whole. In all of these cases the following problems were observed that have
largely distorted, if not perverted, the outcomes of reforms.
1. Increase in inequality and privileges
As long as the gap between formal and informal institutions increases, large,
powerful, and potentially dangerous groups create pressure to release them from the
harshness of reforms, and very often succeed. Such a fragmentation often provides
them with rents. This corresponds to the logic of a limited access order that has to buy
political support for rents. But it means that from the viewpoint of transformation to
an open access order such institutional changes can be rather counterproductive. 
For example, in 1996 the package of “European-like” tax legislation was
prepared in Ukraine under the supervision and with vast technical assistance from
international organizations. The drafted laws seemingly met modern Western
standards and were designed in a way that should facilitate further harmonisation
with EU standards. In 1997 the package was broken down, but most of the laws
were eventually adopted, although with numerous substantial amendments. Already
at the stage of draft bills they were pierced with hundreds of corrections mostly
providing for various privileges, which made them worse than the pre-reform
legislation. Later on, permanent manipulation with privileges and attempts to open
(and later on, fix) the tax loopholes (all together constituting hundreds of
amendments per year!) have made this legislation terribly unstable. Even in 2004,
seven years after, there were more than 30 corrections of tax legislation within a
single year (IFC, 2005). Such instability became an additional and, in many cases,
the most cumbersome business impediment in Ukraine for many years. Later, huge
privileges were also granted to some industries and territories (in the latter case –
with a reference, above all, to the alleged European experience). As of 2006, the
system of taxation remained highly unstable and primarily confiscatory, since tax
authorities have to fulfill the plan on tax collection, and the most important taxes
are subject to negotiations (as admitted in public by top officials). Their unequal
enforcement is one of the most powerful tools for the limitation of access.
Meanwhile, tax administration remains the top impediment to business
development, while tax rates (still quite high) are usually rated as the major
impediment to business, after business regulation (IFC, 2005; GCR 2000-2006).,
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2. Overall deterioration in enforcement and implementation of the law, increase
in corruption
The gap between formal and informal arrangements is filled with discretion and
corruption, respectively. They corrode overall respect for the law and tend to be
widespread throughout society, thereby hindering the effectiveness of the law in other
spheres too. The social order before the reforms could be well adapted to poor law
enforcement and a lack of formal regulation. Reforms may destroy the respective adaptive
mechanisms, while being unable to replace them with any viable alternative instead. 
For example, right after his coming to power in 1696, the young and ambitious
Tsar Peter I (later called The Great), after being inspired by the example of the
Netherlands initiated an attempt at modernizing the patrimonial state of Muscovite
Rus’. Although these reforms were mostly successful, they were not, in fact, concise
enough to build an open-access order (and actually were not aimed at this). They were
primarily aimed at establishing genuine bureaucratic rule, which they failed to do, as
well as in setting up the rule of law for elites. Despite formal reform, patrimonial
practices persisted in the form of rampant corruption and nepotism. Volkov (2000)
argues that, in a way, they have increased (or even begot) the corruption in Russia.
On the one hand, previously well-established practices, such as giving gifts to bosses,
have suddenly became qualified as corrupt, and respectively condemned. Quite loose
and innumerous laws that have emerged in the pre-reform society were previously
respected, but the new laws have not been respected.
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11 They were successfully eliminated in 2001, but the other deficiencies largely remain.
Source: World Bank.
Figure 2.1. Tax arrears in Ukraine in 1995-2001
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For the same reason, tax reform in Ukraine failed to improve tax collection. From
the very beginning it failed to abolish the soft budget constrains for enterprises11. Tax
arrears that were previously substantial, skyrocketed right after the new laws entered
into effect from January, 1998 (Figure 2.1).
According to enterprise survey data, in approximately half of cases, the tax
authorities tried to misinterpret the law (IFC, 2005). Also, according to recent
business surveys, the tax administration is rated first in corruption (BIZPRO, 2005b). 
Further solidification of inefficient informal institutions 
The gap between formal and informal arrangements, if it persists, can become a
ground for vested interests associated with informal but powerful structures benefiting
from the very existence of this gap. For example, this can refer to corrupted officials
abusing their discretionary power for political purposes, privileged (“crony”) businesses,
and so forth. Such interests can successfully prevent the gap from closing, or even widen
it further. If the gap becomes too wide, it may lead to an “institutional trap” (Polterovich,
2001): reforms that are too harsh and restrictive can create a self-propelling institutional
gap. The opposite case (actually analyzed by Polterovich) can also take place, although
this seems to be much less likely: too rapid liberalization can potentially create such
large windfall rents from arbitrage that respective players are able to monopolize the
markets and “capture” the state in order to protect this monopoly. 
For example, in the more than two centuries since the Petrovian reforms, the
Bolsheviks have further worsened the situation by implementing their artificially
designed institutional arrangements. They have attempted to impose artificially
designed formal institutions, including strict bans for private property,
entrepreneurship, and market exchange. This attempt was doomed from the very
beginning due to the coordination failure inherent to pure central planning, and even
more due to the failure in setting production incentives under an ideologically pure
communism. While facing a real economic collapse the Bolsheviks had to sacrifice
ideological dogmas and allow small business and private land ownership. Later, even
when these policies were mostly reversed, the market practices persisted and even
became essential due to their decisive role in compensating the numerous failures of
central planning (Smith and Swain, 1999). They took, however, a specific form of
barter exchange with “favors of access” to different kinds of discretionary
opportunities provided by the positions of the member of the social network within
the Soviet system (Ledeneva, 1998). Goods and services in short supply; career
promotions; entering the universities; release from various official and semi-official
duties, up to military service, and many other favors were widely traded within so
called blat reputation-based networks of interpersonal exchange. By open-access
order standards, this would be called corruption.
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These networks of favors have survived the crash of the Soviet system and
nowadays substantially hamper establishment of the new, “open-access” institutions
(as predicted by Litwack, 1991, and described by Ledeneva, 2000). In particular,
those who used to have preferential access to influential or well-informed officials in
the Ukrainian tax authorities have largely benefited from the instability and
unpredictability of tax legislation, because they suffered much less than their
competitors not involved in respective networks. 
Yet another closely related example is anti-corruption policies aimed at increasing
the risk of being punished in cases of corruption. Given that under the “soft” rule of
law the legislation is very often difficult to implement, and therefore corruption is a
normal practice, catching and jailing of selected scapegoats does not, in fact,
significantly reduce the overall level of corruption. However, as long as enforcement
remains selective, the anti-corruption persecution is used mostly as a tool in the
political, bureaucratic or business wars against rivals, not necessarily the most
corrupted persons. Their punishment is respectively (and for the most part fairly)
perceived as a result of their bad luck or inability to concord with those in power,
rather than as fair consequence of their corrupt behavior12. On the other hand, the
increasing risk of corrupted deals further solidifies the networks of favors, both at the
nexus between business and bureaucracy (reputation is needed to give a bribe,
otherwise the bribe-taker risks too much), and within the bureaucracy (in order to
protect her/himself from being selected as a scapegoat, a corrupted bureaucrat has to
establish and maintain good connections with upper authorities and law enforcement
officers). Both effects, in turn, lead to further limitation of access through increased
barriers of entry due to higher bribe taxes and direct obstacles for those who are less
involved in networks of favors. 
These risks, as exemplified by past experiences, should be taken into consideration
in the course of elaboration of EU policies towards its Eastern neighbors. Now we
turn to analysis of what problems the harmonisation efforts with the EU can meet (or
already do) in CIS countries. 
2.4. Challenges to institutional harmonisation with the EU
Customs
Harmonisation and simplification of customs legislation and procedures is one of
the key items on the agenda of EU relations with its neighbors. The ENP Progress
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12 For example, Farhad Aliyev, the Minister of the Economic Development of Azerbaijan, was displaced and
arrested in October 2005 for allegedly plotting a coup. In fact, this was caused by an internal struggle within
the administrative powers. However, soon the initial allegation failed, and it was immediately replaced with
the criminal prosecution on corruption.
Report on Ukraine (European Commission, 2006b),  for example, reports many
measures that were taken to this end, including implementation of the concept of a
"single window" at the borders, harmonisation of customs valuation rules with WTO
standards, introduction of electronic customs declarations etc. Nonetheless,
according to World Bank Enterprise Survey data, the customs procedures still pose a
major impediment to trade. Specifically, the average time to clear direct exports
through customs has increased by more than 21% from 2002 to 2005; and average
time to claim imports from customs has increased by as much as 46%. As a result, the
percentage of firms that trade directly has shrunk by almost 30%. From anecdotal
evidence we can suggest that these complications were attributed to the queues at the
“single windows”, red tape, and more rigorous implementation of complicated and
cumbersome (but arguably justified) procedures stipulated by the current legislation.
Trade in goods
In the area of trade in goods, harmonisation with the EU implies adoption of
European and international legislative and administrative practices for standards,
technical regulations and conformity assessment in EU harmonized areas, as well as
gradual removal of non-tariff barriers. But at least in some cases these measures are
offset, sometimes in a creative way. For example, after long and hard negotiations the
Ukrainian parliament had to lift the ban for importing of cars older than eight years,
as required for WTO accession. However, it simultaneously introduced a special fee
for the first registration of such cars. The level of the fee was set at a prohibitive level,
i.e. making importation of old cars not profitable. Sometimes such new restrictions
may become even more cumbersome and irremovable than the initial ones. 
The area of product certification should be treated with caution. The European
approach is that mandatory certification is demanded only for safety reasons, while
the rest of goods and services are certified on a voluntary basis or not certified at all.
On the contrary, the Soviet approach (often still inherited by the CIS countries)
required all of goods to be certified – merely because there was no other way to
control their quality, since market competition was absent. While it is necessary to
dispose of the remnants of mandatory certification of quality, this could aggravate the
problem of information asymmetry. For this reason, mandatory certification should
be necessarily replaced with mandatory requirements on the information disclosure.
Besides, it would be recommended that governments in some way facilitate both the
producers’ access to voluntary certification, and the consumer associations’ work on
independent evaluation of goods and services. For instance, assistance may need to be
provided to the respective civil organizations in order to help them in building
capacity for independent quality control.
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Regulatory policy
In order to improve the transparency of regulation, the Law on the State Regulatory
System of Ukraine was adopted in 2003. Yet, the “soft” enforcement of the law makes
it irrelevant. The law is, in fact, ignored, as most by-law drafts are still not  being
published before their adoption, as required by this law. The modern Law of Ukraine
on the licensing system of 2005 that abolished all kinds of additional licensing
requirements set up by the local authorities is also largely ignored. In a way, both cases
can be treated as a sort of selective enforcement in respect to the lower level officials
responsible for their implementation. Both cases have contributed to the preservation
of an important, although informal way, of discrimination against foreign investors.
Domestic firms are used to overcoming problems such as opaqueness, ambiguity and
unpredictability of legislation, as well as its excessive complication, red tape, and so
forth, by the means of petty corruption. Respectively, the barriers of this kind are
known in effect to be discriminating against foreign investors, which are less prone to
corruption and less involved in the informal networks that facilitate corrupted
transactions and thereby reduce the bribe tax for their members. 
Company law and establishment
In the realm of company law and establishment, harmonisation with EU norms
envisages convergence and effective implementation of key principles on company
law, accounting and auditing with international and EU rules and standards. In the
meantime, the acting Ukrainian company law already requires mandatory disclosure
of the company’s information. But many firms currently refuse to submit their annual
reports for disclosure, as stipulated by the acting law. For instance13, only 22% of all
joint stock companies (and 64% of the open joint stock companies)14 submitted their
statements to the respective supervisory government body in 2004 (the later data not
available). This may be attributed to their desire to cover the true indicators that are
manipulated or concealed from confiscatory taxation. On the other hand,
international accounting standards are neither fully implemented, nor enforced, and
significantly differ from those of tax accounting. According to some claims, state
officials are interested in maintaining the opaqueness of accounting, because it allows
for manipulations with statistical data, and even puts pressure on firms with the goal
of  forcing them to submit manipulated reports.
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13 According to the data of the State Commission on Securities and the Stock Market,
http://www.ssmsc.gov.ua/8/9/
14 These numbers may be overestimated. They are calculated on the basis of the total number of reports received
by the State Commission on Securities and the Stock Market, which also includes issuers of securities other
than shares. Not all of them are joint stock companies.
2.5. Recommendations  
Based on theoretical provisions and the overview of the experiences of CIS countries
from various harmonisation initiatives, we have the following recommendations for the
harmonisation of institutions of CIS countries with those of the EU:  
1. Encouraging economic and political competition is the key to stimulating the
transition to an open access order. On the political side, this may involve
facilitating the development of civil society and encouraging free and fair
elections (something the EU is already doing). On the economic side, the
measures may involve exposure to international competition and
encouragement of internal competition. In this context, the EU’s encouragement
regarding WTO accession (for example, in relation to Russia and Ukraine) as a
precondition for further development of economic relations is a good policy, as
it stimulates opening of the economy and, thus, promotes competition.
2. Abrupt changes in institutions should be avoided, as this will most likely lead to
the emergence of a gap between formal and informal institutions, which may
exacerbate many existing problems, including corruption and soft rule of law.
Rather, harmonisation needs to be gradual, starting with things that are
acceptable by the existing order. If harmonisation is not sufficiently supported
by respective political players, it can be offset with some countermeasures or be
implemented selectively. Thus, if the introduction of a particular institution is
likely to create too many victims, then it is sometimes better to refuse its
implementation or postpone it for awhile. However, in order to avoid the partial
reform trap (Hellman, 1998) while adopting the gradual approach, one needs to
make sure that state institutions are able to credibly commit to obeying a
schedule of gradual liberalization despite possible political pressure.
3. Begin with harmonisation of organizations, and proceed to laws and regulations
later. The way in which a bureaucracy and law enforcement operates should be
given a priority against the particular regulations that they are supposed to
implement and enforce. In particular, the government bodies in charge of
business regulation should adapt to the implementation of rules concerning the
disclosure of information; those managing the agricultural sector – to the
European sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures; the same goes for regulators on
the capital markets, certification agencies, and so forth.
4. To the extent possible, eliminate all sources of opaqueness, opportunities for
personal discretion, complications, and other potential corruption vulnerabilities
from the proposed legislation – even at the expense of its flexibility and other
theoretically desirable features.
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5. Make sure that the remaining discretionary opportunities are well checked with
transparency and responsibility. Be aware that the latter would be subject to
strong pressure, and often will not be obeyed at all. So, the respective checks and
civil society control should be developed simultaneously.
6. Make a realistic assessment (through a field investigation, for instance) whether
a regulation can be effectively and evenly enforced, in order to make sure that it
will not become subject to discretionary enforcement. It seems likely, a priori,
that some restrictions, like information disclosure requirements for firms,
veterinary, phytosanitary and many other norms in agriculture, environmental
regulations, protection of personal data and intellectual property rights, and
some other kinds of norms imposed in the process of institutional harmonisation
may become subject to selective implementation. 
Conclusion
Importation of European formal institutions by CIS countries can face a range of
challenges due to peculiarities in the existing institutional setup of these countries.
This set up can be characterized as a “limited access order”, in which economic and
political competition is limited, giving room for rent-seeking and corruption.
Examples of previous attempts to introduce modern Western institutions show the
limitations of harmonisation. The key recommendations for increasing the chances of
success in harmonisation with the EU include: facilitating enhanced competition,
both economic and political;  enhancing the capacity of civil society institutions;
gradualism; reforming institutes first; reduction in the possibilities for discretion;
ensuring transparency of the rules; making sure the new regulations can be
implemented evenly. More generally, the focus should be not on the transfer of formal
institutions, but on the transfer of basic principles (competition and rule of law)
adapted to local conditions; the transfer of formal norms should be subordinate to this
task, or at least should not contradict it.
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Introduction 
As was discussed in Chapter 1, better market access will be one of the major
benefits of institutional harmonisation between the EU and its neighbors and is likely
to bring welfare gains. Removal of non-tariff barriers15 (NTBs) to trade is key to
getting better market access.   
This chapter is devoted to the discussion of methodologies to measure NTBs and
results of their application. It contains a review of the studies on measuring NTBs and
their economic impact for the ENP countries, including the sources of data they use.
Also, as a benchmark of possible effects of better market access between the EU and
its neighbors, we use the experience of integration of Central and Eastern European
Countries (CEECs) into the EU internal market in the process of enlargement. ENP
countries start from a similar position as CEE countries when they began integration
with the EU. Also, ENP countries will have to follow a route similar to that of the
CEECs on their way to the EU market, although on a lesser scale due to the limited
nature of their integration with the EU. 
The analysis in this chapter will serve as a basis for elaboration of a CGE model
for measurement benefits from institutional harmonisation between the EU and CIS,
in particular, incorporating the effects of the removal of NTBs in the model.  
3.1. NTBs in intra- and extra-EU trade: magnitudes and methods of measurement 
Further integration of the ENP countries with the EU can affect the economies of
both the ENP countries and the EU in several ways: via trade, FDI, domestic
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15 Non-tariff barriers to trade are restrictions to imports that are not in the usual form of a tariff.
Chapter 3.
Measuring non-tariff barriers and
their impact on the economy
By Iryna Orlova (CASE Ukraine) and Svitlana Taran
(CASE Ukraine)
investment, etc. These effects work through at least three major channels: first, the
elimination (or at least reduction) of administrative barriers, such as reduced costs of
passing customs at the frontier; second is mitigation of risks and uncertainties, which
form substantial impediments to trade, for example, instability of the business
environment; third is the reduction in technical barriers to trade (TBTs). The single
market reduces TBTs by means of mutual recognition of different technical
regulations, minimum safety requirements and harmonisation of rules and regulations. 
3.1.1. Methods for quantifying NTBs 
Earlier studies (e.g. Baldwin et al., 1997; Keuschnigg and Kohler, 2002) admit that
quantifying the accession to the internal market is not an easy task. The complexity of
single market access makes it impossible to model it explicitly in a general
equilibrium model. The standard solution used by these authors is to model single
market access crudely as a reduction in the real cost of trade. So, the authors did not
attempt to actually measure NTBs and thus quantify their impact, but simply made
assumptions on trade cost reductions. Thus, Baldwin et al. (1997) assume this to be
equivalent to a 10% reduction in real cost of all CEEC-EU trade, whereas Keuschnigg
and Kohler (2002) argue that a trade cost reduction of 5% is appropriate. As Nahuis
(2004) notices, these approaches have some obvious limitations. First, any such
number is arbitrary. Second, the number is identical for all countries. Third, the
number is identical for all industries. Again, Nahuis (2004) in his work shows that the
impact of the internal market accession is markedly different across industries and
countries. Taking into account the above mentioned limitations, alternative methods
of measuring NTBs have been recently developed.
This recent, yet small but growing literature, is estimating NTB equivalents based
the following three methods of measurement. First, frequency-type measures can be
constructed using databases on trade control measures such as the UNCTAD database
(it is commodity/sector and country specific) or using special surveys on how trading
firms perceive or experience NTBs. Based on such data, frequency or import coverage
ratios are developed16. These ratios are subsequently used to calculate tariff
equivalents. Second, price-comparison measures, where estimates of NTBs are derived
based on differences between domestic and foreign prices17. Since the price impact is
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16 The frequencies are calculated for commodity categories that were subject to some identifiable NTB in a
specific year. The number of product categories subject to NTBs is then expressed as a percentage of the total
number of product categories in each commodity group. This is referred to as the frequency ratio. The import
coverage ratios are calculated by determining the value of imports of each product subject to NTBs,
aggregating by applicable commodity group, and expressing the value of imports covered as a percentage of
total imports in the corresponding commodity group.
17 Provided the data on prices is available.
a general property of NTBs, such a price comparison can pick up the net effects of all
NTBs that are present in a market. Percentage differences between the prices are
calculated, comparable to tariffs, which are commonly referred to as tariff equivalents.
However, the drawback to such a method is the impossibility of identifying what NTBs
are the sources of price differences. A quantity measure would be preferable to a price
measure. Thus, we move to the third method - quantity-impact measures. The objective
here is to estimate what trade would have occurred in the absence of NTBs and to
compare it with actual trade. This method involves the estimation of econometric
models of trade determination based on: the theoretical models of Heckscher-Ohlin
(trade based on comparative advantage), Helpman-Krugman (trade based on product
differentiation) or the estimation of gravity models of international trade. All of these
approaches measure NTBs using either residuals from the estimated regressions as
representing NTBs or various dummy variables. Besides these three general methods
of measurement mentioned above there are also special purpose methods18, extensively
described in the study of Deardorff and Stern (1998).  
Deardorff and Stern (1998) provide a thorough survey of currently available
methods for quantifying NTBs. Another, more recent paper, by Anderson and
Wincoop (2004) surveys the measurements of trade costs, including non-tariff
barriers. They provide information, inter alia, on public sources of barriers to trade.
Namely, the authors build on UNCTAD’s Trade Analysis and Information System
(TRAINS), which contains information on trade control measures (including non-
tariff measures) for a maximum of 137 countries beginning in the late 1980s. The
TRAINS database records the presence or absence of a non-tariff barrier on each 6
digit line. Many differing types of NTBs are recorded in TRAINS (a total of 18 types).  
3.1.2. Studies on CEECs using a frequency-type method 
A range of studies look at the issue of border effects19 in the enlarged EU economic
space in the context of technical barriers to trade (e.g. Brenton and Vancauteren,
2001; Chen, 2004). However, evidence on CEECs is still quite scarce. 
Thus, Manchin and Pinna (2003) try to see whether some differences could be
observed in the importance of border effects in trade in products with different
magnitudes of technical barriers. They examine bilateral trade flows in the CEECs
using data for the period 1992-1998 between a sample of accession countries (Cyrpus,
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18 Special purpose methods include: (1) elasticity estimation; (2) determinants of variations in elasticity
estimates; (3) variations in effects of NTBs over time; (4) binding of NTBs; (5) risk characteristics of NTBs.
19 Exchanges between economic actors are normally found to cost more if they cross any kind of administrative
borders. The difference in the costs involved in moving products within a country or between countries is part
of the underlying nature of the border effect.
Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia and Poland) and the EU. Manchin and Pinna (2003) use the
same Commission’s review of the impact of the Single Market in the EU as
Vancauteren and Weiserbs (2003). They group products by the approach adopted by
the EU to remove technical barriers: the old approach, other approach (including
mutual recognition, new approach), and mixed approach (includes products where
the old approach and other approach are applicable). They find that border effects are
the largest for old approach products, where they expect to have the most significant
technical barriers to trade due to complicated harmonisation procedures. Their
countries of interest would trade with themselves 114 times more in old approach
products, while only 25 times more in other approach products. However, the authors
notice that the estimated border effects seem to be too large to be consistent only with
the presence of trade barriers. 
Another recent study, Chevassus-Lozza et al. (2005) aims to assess the role of NTBs
for new member states’ exports but only in the agri-food sector. The authors divide
NTBs into three categories (sanitary and phytosanitary measures, quality measures,
and import certificates) and include them in their gravity model. They analyze eight
new member states: Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Hungary, and Slovenia in a cross-section design (1999 and 2003) to compare the
dynamics of the role of various trade barriers and thus answer the question on the
changing role of NTBs over time. The data on NTBs is taken from the French Customs
source20 that hosts the electronic version of EU border regulations. This website
contains notes on the official sources and the regulations are available in detail. The
authors include three dummy variables representing NTBs: sanitary and phytosanitary
measures (SPS), quality and import certificates. They find that in 1999 these three
NTBs indeed represented serious obstacles to trade. In 2003 their role had diminished,
most notably for SPS and quality. The change in the size of their coefficients between
1999 and 2003 (the coefficient for SPS changed from -0.63 to -0.25; quality: from -0.31
to -0.07) can be interpreted as an indication of the progress made by these countries in
implementing the acquis communautaire in the pre-accession period.
3.1.3. Studies on CIS using  frequency-type data 
In the case of CIS countries, the availability of NTB datasets and empirical
evidence on their impact on trade flows between CIS countries and the EU is very
limited. In most cases the existing international datasets contain rather outdated, or
incomplete (in terms of country coverage) or highly aggregated data on NTBs for CIS
countries. For example, CIS countries are on the list of country coverage of the
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20 www.douane.gouv.fr
aforementioned UNCTAD Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) but the
latest NTB data are of 1997 for most of these counties. Such a situation with NTB data
availability and quality has a negative impact on the precision of the research results.  
Notwithstanding the above, the data from UNCTAD’s TRAINS have been frequently
used by researchers and policy makers in their studies on NTBs’ role in world trade,
including CIS countries. The most recent among them is the study by the World Bank
Development Economics Research Group (Kee, Nicita and Olerreaga, 2006) that
provides estimates for three measures of trade protection in the form of tariff
equivalents – trade restrictiveness indices. These measures include: (i) trade
restrictiveness index (TRI), which is an indicator of a country’s trade protection that
measures trade distortions (or domestic inefficiencies) of a country’s trade policies
imposed on itself (ii) overall trade restrictiveness index (OTRI), which reflects the
restrictiveness of a country’s trade policy imposed on its importers (import losses), and
(iii) market access overall trade restrictiveness index (MA-OTRI), which captures the
effect of trade barriers of other countries imposed on exports of each separate country. 
Ad-valorem equivalents were estimated for certain NTBs21, agricultural domestic
support for each 6-digit HS category and for 104 countries. Data on core NTBs was
obtained from UNCTAD’s TRAINS database, whereas data on agricultural support –
was taken from WTO members’ notifications (previously constructed by Hoekman, Ng
and Olearreaga, 2004). Final estimates of this several-stage study, in particular (i)
import demand elasticities; (ii) ad-valorem equivalents of core NTBs and agricultural
domestic support (in percentage form), and (iii) trade restrictiveness indices22
(computed for broad aggregates: overall trade, agriculture and manufacturing) can be
freely accessed through the World Bank trade website. 
Obtained results allowed authors to make the following conclusions on trade
barriers across countries: (i) NTBs make a significant contribution to world
protection - on average,  adding an additional 70% to the level of trade restrictiveness
imposed by tariffs (the importance of NTBs is observed to be stronger in developed
countries); (ii) poor countries tend to have more restrictive trade regimes and, at the
same time, higher trade barriers on their exports; (iii) trade restrictiveness is generally
higher in agriculture (in import markets), and agricultural exporters usually face
higher trade barriers on export markets. 
These general findings have relevance to CIS countries covered by the study (Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine) as well. For instance, market access
overall trade restrictiveness index (MA-OTRI) for Ukrainian exporters in the world
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21 The following NTB measures were included: price and quantity control measures, technical regulations, and
monopolistic measures.
22 As well as additional indicators: dead weight losses due to the existing trade restrictiveness (TRI), import losses
due to overall trade restrictiveness (OTRI).
markets equals on average 15.2%, while this index goes up to 49.2% for Ukrainian
agricultural producers and goes down to 11.4% for its manufacturing producers. For the
purpose of comparison, the respective estimates for Russian exporters are as follows:
12.2%, 46.7% and 9.7%, while exporters from the EU encounter on average trade
restrictiveness measures of the similar magnitude 15.1%, 34.3% and 12.2% (see Table
3.1). In regard to trade barriers imposed by CIS countries on their imports, the authors
estimated that Moldova maintains one of the most liberal trade regimes, other countries
reveal almost the same level of tariff restrictiveness. Still, Ukraine’s protection of its
agricultural markets is the highest among the countries considered.
To the best of our knowledge, the most complete NTB database in terms of different
types of NTBs and time coverage developed for Ukraine is the one constructed by
Veronika Movchan, following the UNCTAD’s TRAINS methodology. In particular, this
dataset reports the presence or absence of a non-tariff barrier in each HS 6-digit tariff
line over from 1993 up to the present. A broad pool of NTBs applied to imports in
Ukraine has been taken into account for the construction of this database, including
core NTBs but not only them (see the full list of NTBs in Appendix B). Such a complete
NTB database makes it possible to compute various types of intensity indices of NTBs
- in the form of simple frequency or import-weighted (import coverage) ratios. 
Besides, an augmented weighted index of NTBs has been computed (Movchan,
2003). As the author states, this index allows differentiating intensity of various types
of the NTBs and aggregating them into one measure23. Having considered NTBs
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23 According to Movchan (2003), the augmented weighted index of NTBs is a “compound additive index that
incorporates a spectrum of non-tariff barriers applied in the country weighted on the value of imports. It
applies the changeable indicator of the non-tariff protection for each type of the NTB what allows preserving
positive characteristics of frequency measures like transparency and universality, at the same time adding
flexibility and better representation of reality”.
Notes: MA-OTRI is estimated using tariff data of 2005-2006 (taking into account tariff preferences) and ad-
valorem equivalents of NTBs (1997- for CIS countries). It measures the restrictiveness of other countries'
trade policies on the export bundle of each country.
OTRI is estimated using tariff data (2005-2006) and ad-valorem equivalents of NTBs (1997- for CIS
countries). It measures the restrictiveness of a country's own trade policies.
Table 3.1. Trade Restrictiveness Indices of CIS countries (Kee, Nicita and Olerreaga, 2006)
Ukraine
Russian
Federation Moldova Belarus Kazakhstan
Market Access Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (MA-OTRI), %
Overall 15.2 12.2 25.9 15.4 15.3
Agriculture 49.2 46.7 43.3 33.8 62.4
Manufacturing 11.4 9.7 18 14.7 11.2
Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI), %
Overall 21.6 22.6 7.4 15.9 14.0
Agriculture 46.4 33.4 16.8 31.2 32.9
Manufacturing 18.4 20.4 5.7 13.7 11.7
applied in Ukraine between 1994 and 2001 the author concluded: (i) in the period
studied, the aggregate intensity of non-tariff protection increased by almost 97% with
a peak in 1999-2000 and gradual reduction afterwards, (ii) evolution of different types
of non-tariff protection revealed that core NTBs, which have the most harmful
influence on trade, had been gradually declining as of 1998 for most commodities,
while on the contrary, the role of technical barriers24 had been steadily increasing;
(iii) food products were the most heavily affected by NTBs (Movchan, 2003). 
Later, these findings were further developed. For example, the augmented
weighted index of core NTBs (quotas, licenses, excise charges, anti-dumping
measures, and minimum custom value) applied to imports in Ukraine over 1999-2004,
was computed and used in Pindyuk (2006). NTB index calculations used in this study
suggest that agriculture, food and agricultural processing, fishing, extraction of coal
have been the most protected sectors in Ukraine in terms of considered NTBs over the
reported period (see Table 3.2). The NTB indices for these sectors even increased by
the end of the respective period, while protection of most of the other sectors has been
gradually declining.
In the World Bank’s “Ukraine Trade Policy Study” (World Bank, 2004) frequency
indices were calculated for  the longer period - between 1993 and 2004, better
revealing the dynamics of the development of a system of non-tariff barriers in Ukraine.
According to it, during the period considered, the simple frequency index calculated
for 17 non-tariff measures including core and technical regulations measures25 more
than doubled by increasing from 7.2 to 17.5 percent, whereas the import coverage
index rose ten times from 1993 to 2004. There was a considerable escalation of the
number of applied safety control measures and compulsory standards certification
during this period, which have become the major component of the NTB index of
Ukraine. In 2001-2002 the NTB frequency index slightly declined due to the
elimination of minimum custom value regulations and easing state procurement
regulations, but in 2002-2004 it grew up again stipulated by extension of the list of
compulsory certification and introduction of new risk-control measures by the Custom
Service of Ukraine26. The author concludes that Ukraine seems to be rather liberal in
terms of the frequency with which official core NTBs are applied, when compared with
OECD countries; it is then mentioned that informal NTBs can also play a substantial
role in transition countries such as Ukraine. Therefore, business surveys investigating
effective trade barriers and the business climate in the country are of great importance
for getting a full picture of reality with regard to the economic impact of NTBs.
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24 They include safety standards and ecological control, compulsory standards certification, and permits for
medicine imports. 
25 See Appendix for their list.
26 World Bank (2004), pp. 48-49.
3.1.4. Special surveys
Another type of frequency-type measures are based on special surveys.  
One recent survey was conducted for five Western Balkan countries (Frohlich,
2005), for which the prospect of EU membership was confirmed during the
Thessaloniki summit in June 2003 (Albania; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Croatia; the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; Serbia and Montenegro). Overall, 2,166
companies from all five countries took part in the survey. Regarding NTBs, companies
were asked to rank various barriers in accordance with their importance. Technical
standards and certification received the highest score, followed by quality control and
consumer protection. Customs procedures were third, followed by access to final end
users. Bureaucratic company registration seems to be relatively less important, taking
the last – fifth place. However, it should be noted that the difference in average grades
given to various NTBs is not very high: on the four-point scale the highest rank
(technical standards, certification) on average stands at 3.8, while the lowest
(bureaucratic company registration) – at 2.9. 
Another survey, which served as a basis for the mentioned above Western Balkan
survey, was conducted for 10 EU candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia) plus Croatia (Frohlich, 2003). The sample for 11 countries was set
at 4,400 enterprises. Actually, 2,725 companies (62% of the target) were interviewed.
In this survey, the questions that might be of potential interest to us were formulated
as an assessment of company compliance with the acquis – in general and by areas;
problem areas in acquis implementation; and cost of compliance with acquis for the
single market. A four-point scale was used, with a score of 4 corresponding to full
compliance, and 1 – very low compliance. According to the survey results, companies,
on average, assessed their general level of compliance at 2.2. Compliance with the
following areas were ranked the highest (2.7): consumer protection and producer
liability; product certification, technical regulations, standards; and work safety. Food
quality and safety on average was rated at 2.6. The lowest scores were attributed to
environmental protection; labels, trademarks, patents; and rules of competition (2.5).
The same questions of compliance were addressed from a different angle: assessing
the expected difficulties accompanying implementation of acquis. Here the area of
product certification, technical regulations, and standards is ranked the highest – 2.8;
food quality and safety – the lowest (1.9).
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3.1.5. Special surveys for CIS
In light of the current intensification of economic relations between the EU and
Ukraine and the perspective for even closer economic cooperation (via establishment
of an FTA) in the future, there is a need to identify and study existing trade tariff and
non-tariff trade barriers that distort Ukrainian exports to the EU and prevent them
from reaching their potential. A recent study (CASE, 2006) aimed to explore whether
the NTBs impede Ukrainian exports to the EU and to what extent. To implement this,
a survey on non-tariff barriers that are faced by Ukrainian exporters to the EU was
conducted in November and December 2006. The survey sample was composed of
510 exporters to the EU, most of which were rather small companies (less than 50
workers) owned by Ukrainian private capital. Most of the surveyed companies were
well involved in trade relations, exporting about half of their production, primarily to
the EU. The survey focused on questions mostly relevant to manufacturing producers
and covered such areas as certification of origin, customs procedures and technical
standards. The EU custom procedures were assessed as relatively easy and not too
costly by Ukrainian exporters (over 72% of firms did not see any problems with them).
According to the survey, respondents on average spent 6% of export value on customs
clearance and wait about one day on the border with the EU. Most of the large
companies analysed claim that costs of compliance with the EU’s technical
regulations are  almost equal to costs of compliance with domestic technical
regulations. Still, small private firms, especially those exporting agricultural products,
consider that the cost of meeting EU technical standards is higher if compared with
domestic costs. However, the perception that product quality requirements are the
most restrictive technical standards is held by both large and small companies.
When asked about the cost incurred to meet the EU’s technical requirements as
part of total production cost, respondents provided rough estimates rather than
calculated numbers. According to them, the average level of costs across the sample
equaled 13.9%, while this number for large foreign-owned forms was greater than the
average and constituted 16.1%. A breakdown by sector shows that the metallurgy and
chemistry industries spent the least on upgrading their commodities to meet EU
requirements, while the textile and apparel industry spent the most (see Table 3.2 for
more detailed information). Regarding the costs associated with passing the testing
and certification procedures, it was estimated as representing 4.2% of total
production costs on average, and was a greater burden for small firms than for large.
Most companies report that there is a high degree of duplication of their efforts due
to the necessity to test production for both Ukrainian and EU requirements. The study
concludes with recommendations for policies aiming at harmonisation of the legal
system  with EU laws in trade related areas. 
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Trade barriers (tariff and non-tariff) encountered by Moldovan exporters to the EU
market were studied in Diomin et al. (2005). The study presents results of a survey
conducted among 95 Moldovan commodity exporters. They were asked to prioritise
the main obstacles to trade with the EU. Most Moldovan exporters perceived high
tariffs as the main obstacle while exporting to the EU (about 20% of surveyed
exporters indicated it was their strongest obstacle). Competitive pressure from EU
producers (about 15%) and limited possibilities for getting a visa (14%) were
considered the next most important impediments to trade with the EU. Interestingly,
Moldovan businesses, in general, considered conformity with EU standards and
obtaining rule of origin certificates as not a very important problem to their trade with
the EU (5% and 6% respectively).
Rutherford et al. (2005), in their assessment of the impact of Russia’s WTO accession
on poverty, estimated the ad valorem equivalence of barriers to foreign direct investment
in service sectors.  These sectors included: telecommunications; science and science
servicing; financial services; railway transportation; truck transportation; pipelines
transportation; maritime transportation; air transportation; and other transportation.
The authors first commissioned surveys in telecommunications, banking and securities,
and maritime and air transportation services by Russian research institutes. Then they
used these surveys, with the supplementary data and research results of Kimura, Ando
and Fujii (2004a, 2004b, 2004c), to estimate the effect of the reduction in barriers to FDI
by assessing the regulatory environment. The estimated ad valorem tariff equivalents to
FDI range from 33% (in telecommunications, science, railway, truck and pipelines
transportation) to 90-95% (air transportation and maritime transportation) (see Table
3.2). In their WTO accession scenario, the authors assume that barriers against FDI will
be reduced to 0 for all sectors studied except for air transportation and maritime
transportation, where the barriers will be reduced to 75% and 80% respectively. 
The same methodology of measuring barriers to trade/foreign direct investments
in services, as in Rutherford et al. (2005), was employed in (Copenhagen Economics,
IER, and OEI, 2005) for Ukraine. This work modeled different scenarios of Ukraine’s
WTO accession and estimated the respective economic impacts of their
implementation. Reform of FDI barriers to the service sector was considered one of
the scenarios (along with reform of import tariffs and improved access to foreign
markets) of Ukraine’s accession to the WTO. To apply this scenario, the authors
estimated ad valorem tariff equivalents of barriers to trade/FDI in three Ukrainian
services sectors: telecommunications (fixed, internet, mobile), railway transport
(freight and passenger) and finance (banking, insurance, securities) (see Table 3.2).
Their estimates revealed that financial services were the most protected among
service sectors in terms of the existing barriers to foreign direct investments and trade
(about 30% ad valorem tariff equivalent), followed by railways (16.7%) and
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telecommunications (4.9%). The study assumes that after Ukraine’s WTO accession
barriers to FDI in financial services would be reduced to about 8%, in
telecommunications – to 2.1% (in railway transport – no changes). The simulation
results led the authors to the conclusion that reform of service sectors and reduction
of barriers to FDI is expected to bring major welfare and GDP gains in the framework
of Ukraine’s accession to the WTO.     
3.1.6. Gravity model approach
The literature quantifying NTB effects in the context of EU enlargement with the
help of gravity models is quite scarce. To the best of our knowledge, there are three
studies examining regional trade and welfare implications of NTBs in the context of
EU enlargement. These are Lejour et al (2001); Nahuis (2004) and Philippidis and
Carrington (2005); (yet, the latter basically replicates the Lejour et al (2001), using
spatial econometric procedures).
Lejour et al. (2001) used the WorldScan model, which is a CGE model for the world
economy. The accession countries were divided into three regions: Poland, Hungary,
and CEEC5 (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania); Baltic countries
were not included. The authors distinguished sixteen sectors: agriculture, raw
materials, ten manufacturing sectors and four service sectors. They derived NTB
equivalents based on the gravity model approach. They used an EU-membership
dummy variable in their gravity equation to estimate the potential trade increase. 
The main findings of this study were as follows: (i) bilateral trade was
systematically higher if two countries are both members of the EU; (ii) internal market
access and removal of NTBs led to considerable potential trade increases for most
sectors (especially in regard to agriculture (by 249%), food processing (by 94%),
textiles (by 134%); (iii) estimated ad-valorem NTB equivalents ranged from 0% to
17.7% among sectors, in particular for agriculture – 17.7%, trade services – 17.2%,
textile and leather – 14.5%, non-metallic minerals – 13.1%, food processing – 11.7%;
noteworthy, according to study’s estimation, trade in services (financial services,
transport and communication) was well liberalized (with 0% tariff equivalents); (iv)
aggregate trade increase for EU countries (2%) was much smaller than for CEECs
countries (Hungary – 44%, Poland – 30%, CEEC5 – 32%).   
The same approach was used by Nahuis (2004) – incorporating an EU-
membership dummy into his gravity equation. In particular, the author assumed that
the dummy indicating whether both countries are EU members provides insight on
the impact of internal market access. The estimations exploited the fact that the ‘old’
EU members operated in a single market since 1992. Therefore, the observed trade
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levels between two EU members relative to trade between two comparable non-EU
members contained information on the NTBs the single market succeeded to remove. 
Similarly to Lejour et al. (2001), Nahuis (2004) carried out an estimation for
sixteen industries; the CEECs were divided into three regions: Poland, Hungary, and
the remaining CEEC. The main findings of Nahuis (2004) lay in line with the previous
study; still, after transforming the coefficients of EU membership dummies into tariff
equivalents the NTB estimate appeared to be higher (up to 30% for some industries:
agriculture – 30%, textiles and leather – 19%, trade services – 17%, etc.).
However, the gravity specification employed in Lejour et al. (2001) was recently
criticized and revisited by Philippidis and Carrington (2005). The authors claim that
the impact of single market access is misrepresented due to the absence of spatial
effects in their gravity specification. 
Philippidis and Carrington (2005) employed spatial econometrics procedures in
gravity modeling and applied the same CGE dataset and aggregation as Lejour et al.
(2001) to ascertain the degree of bias on gravity estimates of predicted trade. Authors
explain that, in the presence of spatial effects (namely spatial dependence, caused by
various degrees of spatial aggregation, spatial externalities and spillover effects, and
the spatial structure of heteroskedasticity), traditional econometric techniques
produce inefficient and, given the implicit misspecification, biased estimates. Their
results suggest that spatial effects in gravity estimations have a dampening impact on
NTBs for 11 out of 16 sectors. In other words, spatial effects estimation suggests that
there was a systematic overestimation of NTBs for 11 sectors when traditional
econometric techniques were used. However, the magnitude of this overestimation
was not substantial. In particular, the NTB tariff equivalent for agriculture amounted
to 7.5%, food processing – 9.4%, textiles and leather - 11%, non-metallic minerals –
11%, etc. They concluded that the inclusion of spatial effects revealed real growth
reductions of around 0.25 per cent for the CEECs, while economic growth for the EU
remained largely unchanged. 
As for Ukraine, the gravity approach for obtaining NTB estimates was applied in a
recent study on the feasibility of free trade between the EU and Ukraine, undertaken
by CEPS ‘The Prospects of Deep Free Trade between the European Union and
Ukraine’ from September 2004 – January 2005 (CEPS, 2006). By using standard CGE
modeling, the authors considered two main scenarios for a possible free trade
agreement, involving progressive degrees of trade liberalization and institutional
approximation. Removing non-tariff barriers was included as an important
characteristic of deep institutional and regulatory convergence in the framework of
the deep FTA+ scenario. The authors used the gravity model technique to estimate the
implicit NTBs at the sectoral level among the regions of their CGE model. In
particular, they introduced dummy variables for different country groupings - EU
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members, accession countries (CEEC and SEEC) or other countries - expecting that
trade usually would be greater if the two countries belonged to the same trade block.
The estimated coefficients of these dummies were later transferred into ad-valorem
tariff equivalents of trade barriers between countries27. The resulting estimates of
NTBs for non-EU countries, including Ukraine, appeared to be rather large, ranging
from 20% for textiles to 40% for food products. 
Conclusions
The overview of various studies on identification and estimation of NTBs and their
economic impact leads to the following general conclusions: 
i) With a reduction in tariffs in the framework of the WTO liberalization, non-tariff
barriers have become a leading component of trade protection measures applied
by countries throughout the world. Therefore, closer market integration that
envisages a reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade in goods, as well as lessening
barriers to FDI, usually brings more economic gains for trading partners than
the mere tariff reduction.   
ii) Indirect estimates of NTBs obtained through a gravity model approach are
usually higher than estimates of other approaches (e.g. frequency indices), which
use direct evidence on the prevalence of NTBs. The former usually take into
account the broader range of non-tariffs barriers since they capture all existing
non-tariff barriers to trade (including informal measures), thus providing the
upper bound of estimated NTBs. Gravity estimations can be used to measure
how NTBs prevent trade between countries from reaching its potential, whereas
frequency indices, per se, do not measure the influence of NTBs on trade.
Business surveys reflecting entrepreneurs’ perceptions are also useful in
complementing the picture on the significance of NTBs for economic agents
involved in foreign trade, but their quantitative estimations are susceptible to
respondent bias.       
iii) Different approaches for estimating NTBs (frequency indices, gravity modeling
or enterprises’ perception surveys, etc.) usually provide higher NTBs estimates
for agricultural products compared to industrial products. NTBs estimates of
non-tariff barriers to FDI and trade in services in general appear to be high as
well, particularly in developing and transition countries.  
iv) In the structure of NTBs, the role of core non-tariff barriers diminishes, while
the importance of regulatory differences and technical barriers to trade and
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27 Neither the description of the methodology for doing this transformation nor the resulting estimates of ad-
valorem tariff equivalents of trade barriers were presented in this study.
market access gradually increases, thus stipulating the need to take the latter
into account while investigating the impact of NTBs on trade and economic
performance.                   
Country specific conclusions: 
i) Studies estimating the impact of Eastern EU enlargement and accession of the
CEES countries to the Single European Market report that internal market
access and lessening of NTBs may lead to considerable aggregate trade increase
for CEES countries well exceeding the trade increase for the ‘old’ EU members.
The same refers to welfare gains due to EU enlargement28. The estimated non-
tariff barriers to trade differ substantially between sectors: agriculture and food
products, trade services, textiles and leather, non-metallic minerals and
electronic equipment had the highest level of protection. As a result, these
particular sectors may benefit the most from gaining access to the EU internal
market and lessening non-tariff protection. The reviewed studies revealed rather
low barriers to FDI and trade in services between CEES countries and the ‘old’
EU members, indicating a high level of liberalization in this important area of
international economic relations. Still, institutional harmonisation and
alignment of domestic standards with those of the EU will not lead to full
elimination of NTBs, in particular technical standards, in EU-CEES and intra-
EU trade: in Cecchini (1998) the cost of existence of NTBs for the EU members
was estimated 2-2.4% of the EU GDP.
ii) CIS and Ukraine: the magnitude of NTBs and their role in trade between the
EU and CIS countries, as well as between CIS countries themselves, proved to
be a very important matter. Business surveys conducted for Ukraine show that
the costs of meeting EU technical standards are considered rather high and
burdensome by Ukrainian producers (CASE, 2006) (see Table 3.2 below). These
costs are perceived as the highest (reaching more than 30% of yearly production
costs) by Ukrainian enterprises producing apparel, agricultural and food
processed products, wood products, and non-metallic mineral products.
Estimates of barriers to FDI in the services sectors derived for Ukraine and
Russia prove the existence of significant restrictions to trade and foreign
investment in these sectors; abolishing or reducing such restrictions may bring
significant welfare gains for both countries (Copenhagen Economics, IER, and
OEI, 2005; Rutherford et al. (2005)). The upper bounds of existing NTBs to EU-
Ukraine trade estimated through the gravity model approach are even greater,
ranging from 20 to 40% depending on the concrete industry (CEPS, 2006). The
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28 The magnitude of derived estimates depends on the divergence in trade protection data used by the researchers
(e.g., in Maliszewska M. (2004) expected gains of GDP for Hungary equals 7%, Poland – 3.4%, while in Lejour
et al. (2001), 9% and 5.8% respectively).
NTB system developed by Ukraine followed the general trends in international
trade: agriculture, food and agricultural processing, fishing, etc. have been the
most NTB protected sectors in Ukraine; the significance of technical barriers
have been increasing in the structure of applied NTBs (World Bank, 2004).         
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Notes:
* Percentage of total year production costs spent in order to ensure products compliance with the EU norms,
Ukraine, 2006.
** Augmented weighted index for NTBs (quotas, licenses, excise charges, anti-dumping measures, and
minimum custom value), Ukraine, 2004.
*** Ad valorem tariff equivalents of barriers to FDI applied against foreign service providers, Ukraine, 2005. 
**** Ad valorem tariff equivalents of barriers to FDI in service sectors applied against foreign service
providers, Russia, 2005.
Table 3.2. Estimated non-tariff barriers for Ukraine and Russia
Sectors CASE, 2006* Pindyuk, 2006** IER, 2007***
Rutherford et al.,
2005****
Applied
to  Ukrainian
exporters to EU
Applied to all
importers
to Ukraine
Applied to all
importers
to Ukraine
Applied to all
importers
to Russia
Agriculture 11 27.8
Forestry 22.4
Food processing 11 31.9
Fishing 33.5
Extraction of energy materials 17.1
Extraction of coal 19.1
Extraction of non-energy materials 14.3
Textile and apparel 13.9
Textiles and leather 19
Leather and footwear 17.2
Wood 14.2
Paper 9.7
Coke and oil refining 18.9
Rubber and plastic goods 12.5
Other non-metal mineral products 10
Metals 5
Iron and steel 8.1
Chemistry and petrochemical 5 16.7
Machinery and equipment 12 11.2
Electrical and electronic equipment 14.2
Transport equipment 11.4
Other production 12.4
Electricity, gas and water supply 5.9
Telecommunications 33
- fixed 5.2
- Internet 3.4
- mobile 6.1
Financial services: 36
- banking 21,9
- insurance 36
- securities 28,7
Railway transportation 16,7 33
Science & science servicing 33
Truck transportation 33
Pipelines transportation 33
Maritime transportation 95
Air transportation 90
Other transportation 33
Institutional harmonisation with the EU is not going to be without cost for EN
countries. Both the public and private sector will have to incur certain expenses and
make adjustments. In this chapter we review these costs and discuss ways for
measuring them. On the basis of this analysis, we develop an outline of a methodology
to measure costs of institutional harmonisation of EN countries with the EU in the
context of the implementation of enhanced FTAs.  
As was suggested in Chapter 1 of this paper, the subject of our study is defined as
follows: costs of institutional harmonisation of the EU Eastern neighbors in the
context of implementing enhanced free trade agreements. In this context, institutional
harmonisation is going to be directed at gaining better market access and integration
in energy and infrastructure. More specifically, this will include changes in state aid,
public procurement, property rights, quotas, custom procedures, import bans, and
seasonal import regimes, SPS and other related regulations. 
We should note from the very beginning, that the estimation of costs of institutional
harmonisation in the context of trade facilitation is methodologically challenging.
Countries generally do not undertake trade facilitation and institutional harmonisation
as an end in itself. Rather, they occur primarily as part of a wider reform effort driven by
either a transition to a market economy, or accession to a regional or sub-regional
grouping or a trade agreement. As a result, there is often no specific allocation of funding
for pursuing institutional harmonisation per se, making it somewhat very difficult to
assess those specific costs. Therefore, estimation of the costs on establishment of
enhanced FTAs, which are to institutionalize mutual market access, may not fully capture
all of the harmonisation costs involved, but will certainly deliver a notion of their scale. 
4.1. Major Cost Categories 
For the purposes of this study we group the cost of institutional harmonisation into
two major categories: primary and secondary. Furthermore, costs are divided
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Chapter 4.
Measuring costs of institutional
harmonisation
By Veliko Dimitrov, IME
between direct budgetary, direct private corporate, indirect budgetary and indirect
private corporate costs (Table 4.1.)
Primary costs are compliance costs in a narrower sense - regulatory,
administrative, and technical. These are expenses at the country or firm level for
upgrading existing infrastructure, equipment and technology, training and capacity
building, costs related to amending or creating legislation, company compliance with
various technical standards and regulations like labeling and packaging, testing,
inspections and quarantine requirements, etc. 
Secondary costs represent the negative economic impact resulting from
alterations. They can emerge in the public sector (for example, in the form of foregone
customs receipts), and in the private sector (bankruptcies, or fall in employment in
certain sectors). 
4.1.1. Direct budgetary costs
Regulatory costs
Trade facilitation measures may sometimes require new legislation or the
amendment of existing laws in accordance with the national legislative and regulatory
process of each country. This, in turn, will involve time and staff specialized in
regulatory work both in the line ministries and the center of government and
parliament. Resources required for such legislative and regulatory work may differ
significantly depending on the country's legislative structures, procedures and
frequency of changes in legislation (Moise, 2004). 
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Source: Own summary; for more detailed information about types of costs in the practice, see The Balkan
Network (2001).
Table 4.1. Classification of harmonisation-related costs 
Primary costs
• Direct budgetary costs – directly paid from the state budget in order to fulfill certain
requirements on the governmental level (administrative, regulatory, technical) 
• Direct private corporate costs – directly payable by companies in order to achieve
a minimum required level of compliance with a variety of standards and norms
Secondary costs
• Indirect budgetary costs – costs not directly payable by the state budget that emerge
 due to changes in the institutional environment 
• Indirect private corporate costs –indirect costs for company owners and investors
 as a result of company failures and bankruptcies 
Upgrade of customs infrastructure, equipment and technology
Equipment and infrastructure are not a prerequisite for trade facilitation
measures, although some of these measures, such as risk assessment or special
procedures, are greatly assisted by the availability of appropriate equipment and
infrastructure. Border agencies call for information and communication technology
(ICT) products, as well as infrastructure and scanners, primarily because of their
potential to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of customs operations and
control. Numerous studies show that insufficient equipment and infrastructure will
make trade facilitation measures more difficult to implement (Moise, 2004).
Training and capacity building
Training, even if often perceived as a less significant item on the harmonisation
agenda, may use a disproportionately great amount of money. Countries may
generally choose between (Moise, 2004):
• Recruiting new expert staff (if available);
• Training existing staff in a training center;
• On-the-job training;
• Importing trained staff through personal exchange with other government
bodies.
The most commonly observed practice is a combination of (b) and (c). Regular
training is a common practice in many customs administrations, varying only in
frequency and duration. On-the-job training usually does not involve additional direct
budgetary costs, however, it may temporarily increase costs for traders due to
underperformance and incompetence of trainees.
The above measures have to be undertaken (and financed) by the government and,
therefore, depend upon the government’s will and readiness to implement them. The
estimation of the costs of these measures is hardly attainable in principle for the
following reasons. First, they depend greatly on how efficiently reforms are carried
out, their time horizon and organization of public administration. Second, they
cannot be clearly separated from ongoing and future reforms that would take place
anyway. For these reasons, in this study we will not try to measure them and will
focus on the other group of costs - those connected to secondary institutional changes.
4.1.2. Indirect budgetary costs
The major secondary cost on the part of the state is the loss of budget revenue from
tariffs. Harmonisation of customs regulations through establishing FTAs will inevitably
55
INSTITUTIONAL HARMONIZATION IN THE CONTEXT...
CASE Reports No. 75/2007
require reduction or elimination of customs tariffs towards the partner side (EU). As
stated in the ENP strategic papers, deep and comprehensive free trade agreements will
involve the reduction of tariff rates for a range of products. We assume that tariffs will
be harmonized in all non-agricultural and non-fuel products, namely: 
• Ores and metals (SITC Rev. 2: 27+28+68);
• Chemicals (SITC Rev. 2: 5);
• Machinery and transport equipment (SITC Rev. 2: 7);
• Other manufactured goods (SITC Rev. 2: 6+8 less 68).
The estimation of forgone budget revenues could be done based on the datasets for
the import structure of the CIS countries and the average applied import tariff rates using
basic non-econometric calculations (this method is not able to capture any trade creation
unless additional calculations are made). Alternatively, one can simply take advantage of
the results retrieved in other parts of the project, namely Work Package 4 (Analysis of the
economic and institutional consequences of WTO accession and of future EU-CIS free
trade agreements) of the ENEPO project that is constructing a CGE model; or within this
package, the CGE model that we will employ for measuring benefits from market access
can easily be extended to capture the loss of customs revenues.   
4.1.3. Direct private corporate costs
For private entities, the costs of institutional harmonisation are costs of
compliance with qualitative standards and regulations. 
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* Data for the latest available year
Source: UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics 2006, own calculations.
Table 4.1.2. Average applied import tariff rates* on non-agriculture and non-fuel products
imported from developed economies, % 
Product groups/
Countries
Ores and Metal Chemicals
Machinery
and Transport
Equipment
Other
Manufactured
Goods
Armenia (2001) 0 0,02 1,56 3,9
Azerbaijan (2005) 5,96 8,31 7,31 10,97
Belarus (2002) 11,04 7,65 10,52 13,02
Georgia (2004) 6,35 6,16 3,37 7,57
Moldova (2001) 0,72 3,08 2,05 4,82
Russian Federation (2005) 10,16 7,35 8,44 11,78
Uzbekistan (2001) 13,22 8,87 5,09 14,6
CIS simple average 6,78 5,92 5,48 9,52
EU15 (2005) 2,2 4,43 1,85 3,43
The use of standards and technical regulations as instruments of commercial
policy in unilateral, regional and the global trade context has increased as tariff and
quota barriers continue to decline (Wilson, 2007, draft). Standards and technical
regulations are principally used to mitigate food, animal and plant safety risks, to
provide common norms for product characteristics, and/or to internalize
simultaneously ex-ante potential negative market externalities. However, these
technical requirements also constitute barriers to trade by imposing unnecessary
costly and time-consuming tests or by laying out various requirements in different
markets (Chen, Otsuki and Wilson, 2004).
In order to have access to the EU internal market, all neighboring country’s
companies would have to fulfill certain criteria such as qualitative standards and
norms. Although the rules to be implemented would be of a uniform character, we
expect that harmonisation costs would vary from country to country depending on its
current legislation and administrative and business practices. What makes the task to
estimate those costs even more difficult is the fact that the technical regulations and
standards will be mandatory only for export-oriented companies whose number and
capacity could not be undoubtedly estimated. 
Therefore, the exact estimation of compliance costs is not possible. Below we discuss
two qualitatively different approaches and assess their strengths and weaknesses. 
4.2. Review of some methodologies to measure compliance costs on the firm level  
4.2.1. Estimating compliance cost with product standards for companies using
econometric modeling
The study by Maskus, Otsuki and Wilson (2005) represents one of the few attempts
to assess the cost of compliance with standards and technical regulations by
companies in different countries. The authors have developed an econometric model
that estimates the incremental production costs of enterprises in relation to
compliance with standards imposed by the major importing countries or regional
groupings. The main goal is the provision of a rough quantification of these costs to
assess their significance. 
Data used 
The data used for cost estimation is taken from a survey undertaken by the World
Bank explicitly for the purpose of assessing compliance costs of firms in developing
countries facing technical standards in their potential export markets. The World
Bank has completed a database - Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) (World Bank, b)
57
INSTITUTIONAL HARMONIZATION IN THE CONTEXT...
CASE Reports No. 75/2007
- based on a survey of 689 firms in 17 developing countries. The database includes
information on both mandatory technical regulations, as well as the use of voluntary
standards. The data also includes firms' experiences with product testing and their
responses to questions regarding mutual recognition agreements. The survey covers
countries from all regions – Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean,
Middle East, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. For Eastern Europe, Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic and Poland were surveyed. The survey was designed to include a
sufficient number of firms and technical regulations mainly (but not exclusively)
imposed by the EU, the United States, Canada, Japan and Australia. For the three
European countries, the survey demonstrated that among all factors, product quality
appears to be the most important factor in firms’ ability to expand its exports: 77% of
respondents in Bulgaria, 98% in Czech Republic and 88% in Poland found product
quality requirements to be an important factor in their ability to expand exports. 
Approach and assumptions used
Initial investments for achieving compliance with standards and regulations are
modeled as a quasi- fixed factor and estimated using a short-run variable cost function
(firm’s compliance with any domestic standard is a sunk cost and does not affect its
decision to meet foreign requirements). Generally, the firm-function is specified as: C
= C (w, y, s, z ) where, w refers to a vector of factor prices, y is output, s indicates the
stringency of the foreign standard, and z is a vector of other variables affecting firm-
level costs. The cost function is assumed to have standard properties: non-decreasing
in w and y, concave in w, and homogeneous of degree one with respect to w.
The relative increase in setup cost incurred for complying with these standards is
used as a proxy for the stringency of standards, e.g. reported investment represents
the stringency variable. It is constructed from respondents’ answers to the question
“What are the approximate costs of the items below as a percentage of your total
investment costs over the last year?” 
This approach requires three central assumptions:
1) All firms, across industries and countries, share the same technology.
However, observations as well as economic theory suggest that this
assumption is rather unrealistic. Therefore, in vector z, industry and country
fixed effects are included in every specification to control for differences in
technology relative to the benchmark function. Nonetheless, this approach
requires making the residual assumptions that firms within an industry within
each country share the same cost functions and that efficiency differences by
industry and country are Hicks- neutral;
2) It is assumed that the value added cost function is weakly separable from the
aggregator for raw materials and intermediate inputs. The difficulty in
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separating out the cost function implies that the choice of relative labor and
capital inputs will be independent of material and intermediate input prices;
Thus, the cost function is rewritten as follows: 
,
where w1 = (wl, wk) and w
2 is the vector of prices for variable inputs other than labor
and capital. The goal is the estimation of the elasticity of value-added costs (C1) with
respect to standards. The elasticity equation is: 
3) The third assumption is that factor prices are exogenous to firms, permitting
their input choices to be made endogenously. However, data shows that this
assumption does not hold, and firms report different average wage rates (or
annual salaries) and returns to capital. Therefore, direct construction of labor
and capital prices from the survey data makes use of variables that are
endogenous, both in principle and in fact.
The chosen approach to resolving this problem is the application of a national
average salary and price of capital to all firms. Such aggregate prices could be
justified as exogenous to each enterprise, yet at the cost of sacrificing the cross-
sectional variation in factor prices needed to identify the cost function. To cope with
this, Maskus, Otsuki and Wilson employed an instrumental variables technique in
which they recognized that variations in factor prices across firms depend on their
characteristics – firm age (years since founding) and dummy variables indicating the
structure of firm ownership (such data is available in the WB Technical Barriers to
Trade Database (World Bank, b)).  
The total elasticity of cost with respect to a change in the stringency of standards,
accounting for impacts on factor use, is calculated by the following equation: 
where, for firm i, C denotes the cost of labor and capital or the production cost, wl and
wk account for the instrumented wage rate, respectively the instruments unit price of
capital, y denotes sales as a measure of output and s the firm specific measure of
standards. The coefficients βls and βks measure the bias in labor use, in capital use
from an increase in the foreign standard.
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Findings
The results of Maskus et al (2005) show that a 1% increase in investment to meet
compliance costs in importing countries raises variable production costs by between
0.06 and 0.13%, which is a statistically significant increase. Also, fixed costs are
estimated to be about 4.7% of value added on average. Although there are some
studies (e.g. Swann et al, 1996) that support the claim of an efficiency-increasing
effect of regulations, the evidence provided by Maskus et al. (2005) suggests the
opposite, i.e. that technical standards and regulations represent costly barriers to
exporting companies.
Own conclusions in the light of the ENEPO project
• The applied model is very sensitive to input data, which is unique on its own (The
World Bank TBT survey – World Bank, b). Data collection in the field has been
contracted to local consulting companies, but such a task is far beyond the
financial resources of the ENEPO project. This is the main reason why this
approach cannot be applied in our study;
• Furthermore, some of the assumptions are quite unrealistic (“all firms across
countries and industries share the same technology”) and even though industry
and country fixed effects are included in the vector z, an assumption still has to be
made that firms within an industry and each country share the same cost function;
• There is generally no data reported on compliance costs for previous years,
which makes a direct comparison or extrapolation of results impossible;  
• The companies from the countries we will study will conform to standards and
technical regulations on a voluntary basis.
4.2.2. The Standard Cost Model (SCM)29
The SCM is a method for determining administrative costs for businesses imposed
by regulations, i.e. by legislative changes. It is a quantitative methodology that can be
applied in all countries at different levels. The method can be also used to measure a
single law, selected areas of legislation or to perform a baseline measurement of all
legislation in a country. Furthermore, the SCM is also suitable for measuring
simplification efforts as well as administrative consequences of new legislative
proposals and compliance costs at the firm level.
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29 Used in various countries for assessing national and EU-legislation effects, incl. Austria, Belgium, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and UK.
The Website of the International Standard Cost Model Network can be accessed at the address:
http://www.administrative-burdens.com/
The methodology is an activity-based measurement of administrative burdens
making it possible to follow the development of administrative burdens. At the same
time, the results achieved are directly applicable to governments’ simplification or
harmonisation work.
Costs in the range of the SCM measurement 
SCM methodology divides the costs of regulation into direct financial costs and
primary compliance costs, and then the latter into indirect financial costs and
administrative costs (Figure 4.1).
Direct financial costs (DFC) – result from a concrete and direct obligation to
transfer a sum of money to the government or a competent authority. Such costs
include administrative charges, taxes, etc. For example, all the fees directly payable
for obtaining permits fall into this category. These costs are by no means related to the
need for information or anything else on the side of the government. Basic SCM
formula for the estimation of direct financial costs would be as follows: 
DFC = charges X yearly frequency X number of entities
Primary compliance costs (PCC) – they represent all the costs related to
complying with regulations in a narrower sense. As depicted above, they could be
subdivided further into substantive compliance or indirect financial costs (e.g., filters
required by environmental regulations) and administrative costs (e.g. documentation
for the installation of filters).   
Basic SCM formula for the estimation of primary compliance costs would be as
follows:
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Source: World Bank.
Figure 4.1. Different costs of regulation to business
Administrative costsIndirect financial costs
(substantive compliance costs)
Direct financial costs Primary compliance costs
The costs of regulation
to businesses (overall compliance costs)
PCC = number of entities X objects to be implemented per entity X average price
of the object + number of entities X objects to be implemented per entity X average
time to deal with paperwork
Model application
When carrying out the actual measurement in the SCM framework it is important
to get as detailed data as possible. Not only will this increase the level of accuracy, but
it will also ensure that data can be compared at the disaggregated level. Comparing
aggregated data at the societal level may reveal cross-country differences, but will
often not be enough to explain why there is a difference. In order to explain
differences, it is most often necessary to be able to exclude differences in wages and
overhead costs, and mainly focus on the differences in time spent on performing a
certain administrative activity. 
There are several applications of the SCM publicly available30, yet none of them is
closely related to the goal of Workpackage 11.
Conclusions in respect to SCM model
• The model allows for deep analysis on the level of separate activities and
therefore, the estimations could be highly realistic;
• The SCM is more suitable for the measurement of the impact of regulations but
not process-related costs; at the same time, the detailed approach speaks in favor
of not attempting to apply it in large-scale studies; 
• After reviewing all possibly applicable information, we draw the conclusion that
what is needed is not available (could not be even retrieved out of the existing
datasets without hugely compromising quality of output). Given that, the
application of the model in this study is not possible.
4.3. Methodology proposal 
Based on the review of existing studies on the estimation of costs of compliance
and evaluation of the available data, we suggest the following methodology for
estimating the costs of compliance of CIS countries with EU norms and regulations.
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30 Accessible at: http://www.administrative-burdens.com/default.asp?page=140 
Step 1. Determination of the significance of exports to the EU (as percentage to GDP)
Step 2. Break down of the export sector into several sub-sectors
Due to the fact that compliance costs differ significantly from one sector to
another, we suggest distinguishing between the following sub-sectors:
• Agriculture;
• Manufacturing;
• Services;
• Energy
The only publicly available and compatible statistical data on trade by sectors can
be found at the European Commission website (http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/
bilateral/data.htm). There might be a slight difference between the EC data and the
original data on exports by respective countries because the EC data represents
volumes at CIF prices (import prices), which are cost and insurance and freight; while
exports are generally valued at FOB prices (no insurance and no freight). Due to
possible problems with export data compatibility among various countries, we are
going to use the European Commission data. As a result, the final results might be
slightly overestimated.
Step 3. Use survey data for compliance costs in other countries (CEE)
World Bank Technical Barriers to Trade Survey is the best source of information
on NTBs for developing and transition countries we have found. We are going to use
the estimates on total investments costs and costs by sectors obtained in the survey for
three Eastern European countries – Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Poland. We will
use these estimates to make extrapolations for the neighboring countries. 
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Source: UNCTAD, Handbook of Statistics, own calculations.
Table 4.3.1. Significance of CIS exports to the EU (2004), percent of GDP
Indicators
Countries  
GDP in millions
of US dollars
Exports to EU25
as percentage of GDP
Exports to EU25 in
millions of US dollars
Armenia 3 615 6,4% 231,3
Azerbaijan 8 281 16,6% 1 376,1
Belarus 22 909 14,1% 3 224,4
Georgia 5 113 6,3% 322,2
Kazakhstan 40 743 16,5% 6 707,2
Kyrgyzstan 2 163 1,8% 38,3
Moldova 2 595 18,2 473,5
Russian Federation 582 319 14,8% 85 979,1
Tajikistan 1 911 12,9% 246,1
Turkmenistan 12 374 3,0% 370,4
Ukraine 65 037 13,7% 8 882,4
Uzbekistan 11 788 3,99% 470,2
Step 4. Regrouping the existing export categories of the available datasets 
We need to join together all categories from the above table into four general
groups (agriculture, manufacturing, services and energy) in order to adapt the means
of investment costs for compliance retrieved by Wilson and Otsuki (2004) to the
officially available statistical datasets on exports to the EU (Table 4.3.4.).  
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31 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, Argentina, Chile, Honduras, Panama, Iran, Jordan, India, Pakistan, Kenya,
Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda.
Source: Wilson and Otsuki (2004).
Table 4.3.2. Total investment costs to comply with technical requirements as a share in sales in
three of the CEE countries (percentage)
Country/
Indicator Mean
Standard
Deviation Min Max
Bulgaria 2.15 2.52 0.13 9.68
Czech Republic 5.71 9.12 0.05 31.88
Poland 3.84 10.99 0.03 55.65
Total 3.74 8.26 0.03 55.65
Source: Wilson and Otsuki (2004).
Table 4.3.3 Total investment costs to comply with technical requirements as a share in sales by
industry in all countries31 (percentage)
Industry/Indicator Mean
Standard
Deviation Min Max
1. Raw Agricultural Products 6.18 22.28 0.00 122.14
2. Meat Products 3.43 4.82 0.06 13.36
3. Electrical Equipment 2.40 4.28 0.03 19.32
4. Fabricated Metal 11.21 25.66 0.15 87.25
5. Industrial Machinery and Equipment 1.81 2.14 0.24 4.81
6. Industrial or Agricultural Chemicals 3.17 4.01 0.12 14.36
7. Instruments, Photographic, Optical, Watches 0.26 0.26 0.26
8. Leather and Leather Products 1.98 2.49 0.09 5.50
9. Paper and Allied Products 1.28 1.60 0.15 2.42
10. Printing and Publishing Products 0.29 0.29 0.29
11. Processed Food and Tobacco 4.61 10.61 0.01 55.65
12. Rubber and Plastic Products 5.20 6.18 0.52 17.72
13. Telecommunications and Terminal Equipment 1.57 1.96 0.07 4.73
14. Textiles and Apparel 2.73 6.80 0.01 44.10
15. Transportation Equipment, Auto Parts, Dealers 4.18 8.27 0.25 31.88
16. Lumber, Wood and Furniture 0.45 0.27 0.14 0.73
17. Construction and Construction Related Services 1.43 1.09 0.66 2.20
18. Primary Metal and Metallic Ores 11.27 20.48 0.17 41.96
19. Petroleum and Other Non-Metallic Minerals 9.83 11.50 0.17 23.73
20. Miscellaneous Manufactured Commodities 20.89 50.51 0.02 124.00
21. Drug and Liquor 3.67 3.82 0.38 9.50
22. Material 1.99 1.12 0.70 2.66
23. Other Services 0.26 0.33 0.04 0.63
24. Other 4.60 4.60 4.60
Grand Total 4.44 13.25 0 124
Step 5. Adjustment of the survey-based compliance costs (available for Bulgaria,
Czech Republic and Poland in Europe) for the CIS countries
We suggest using GDP per capita as a benchmark (the most aggregate indicator,
reflecting a wide range of economic phenomena indirectly, including the price levels
of the factors of production) or a combination of GDP per capita and other major
macro indicators. 
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Source: Wilson and Otsuki (2004), own calculations.
Table 4.3.4. Correspondence table
Product groups Corresponding World Bank grouping
Mean of investment costs for
compliance as a share in sales
Agricultural products
Raw agricultural products 6.18%
Primary metals and metallic ores 11.27%
Agricultural products
– average 8.725%
Manufactured products
Meat products 3.43%
Electrical equipment 2.40%
Fabricated metal 11.21%
Industrial machinery and equipment 1.81%
Industrial or agricultural chemicals 3.17%
Instruments, photographic, optical, watches 0.26%
Leather and leather products 1.98%
Paper and allied products 1.28%
Printing and publishing products 0.29%
Processed food and tobacco 4.61%
Rubber and plastic products 5.20%
Telecommunications and terminal equipment 1.57%
Textiles and apparel 2.73%
Transportation equipment and auto parts 4.18%
Lumber, wood and furniture 0.45%
Miscellaneous manufactured commodities 20.89%
Drug and liquor 3.67%
Material 1.99%
Manufactured products
– average 3.95%
Services
Construction and construction related services 1.43%
Other services 0.26%
Services – average 0.845%
Energy
Petroleum and other non-metallic minerals 9.83%
Energy – average 9.83%
The above table shows that the higher the GDP per capita, the higher the share of
the compliance costs. This is, however, somewhat controversial because some of the
related costs are bound to international prices (like equipment, production lines, etc.),
which are not likely to be influenced by national conditions. On the contrary, the
lower the standard of living, the higher the percentage compliance costs would
probably be (driven by the import of special equipment). On the other hand, costs such
as product redesign, additional labor for production, testing and certification are to
be expected to be lower in lower-income countries. Logically, what matters here is the
ratio between labor and capital costs, which is not possible to estimate at this stage.
Then there are two ways to make an extrapolation to CIS countries. 
Scenario 1
Following this scenario, the overall compliance cost percentages would be as
follows:
Due to the controversial result in Table 4.3.5 and considering the great importance
of the extent to which companies actually comply and how do they do that (choosing
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Source: Wilson and Otsuki (2004), UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, own calculations.
Table 4.3.5 Calculation of GDP equivalent of compliance costs in CEE, 2004
          Indicators
Countries
Mean of compliance
costs as share
in company sales (%)
Nominal GDP per capita
in US dollars
1% compliance costs
corresponds to …
US dollars
Bulgaria 2.15 3 137 1 459
Czech Republic 5.71 10 462 1 832
Poland 3.48 6 265 1 800
Average 3.74 6 621 1 697
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, own calculations.
Table 4.3.6 Compliance costs as share in the companies sales
Indicators
Countries  GDP per capita
Suggested overall mean
of compliance costs
Armenia 1 195 0.7%
Azerbaijan 991 0.58%
Belarus 2 335 1.38%
Georgia 1 132 0.67%
Kazakhstan 2 746 1.62%
Kyrgyzstan 416 0.25%
Moldova 615 0.36%
Russian Federation 4 047 2.38%
Tajikistan 297 0.18%
Turkmenistan 2 596 1.53%
Ukraine 1 384 0.82%
Uzbekistan 450 0.27%
Average 1 517 0.89%
the highest possible standard, which is naturally the most expensive one, or on the
contrary – the lowest possible one, thus less costly, or somewhere in the middle) we
will instead apply a simpler scenario – Scenario 2.  
Scenario 2: Estimating the share of the compliance costs for the neighboring
countries as the average for the CEE countries covered by the study of Wislon and
Otsuki (2004)
The only adjustments that we suggest would be appropriate represent some
corrections of the final results as follows (not losing the accuracy and the essence of
the study):
• Lowering the final score for the agricultural sector by 70% due to the
envisaged limited harmonisation (assuming Bulgaria, Czech Republic and
Poland had to harmonize, thus acquire costs, up to 100%);
• Reducing the final scores for the service sector by 50% again due to partial
harmonisation
Both percentage correctives may also differ from country to country (following the
provisions of the ENP Action Plans) or even not be applied at all, since there is no
clear evidence that limited harmonisation, for example in the agriculture sector,
would inevitably lead to proportionally smaller compliance costs. 
On the other hand, the actual compliance costs could be of a larger scale as well,
because if we assume that the costs we intend to estimate are connected to the current
exporters who simply need to maintain the achieved level of harmonisation, there
might also be newcomers who will need to make the initial investments (building or
modifying a whole production line, not simply maintaining it).
Conclusions for Chapter 4
Institutional harmonisation in the context of obtaining better market access entails
various costs, both for the state and private sector, which can be divided into two
major categories: primary (direct budgetary and direct private corporate costs) and
secondary, the latter being subdivided into indirect budgetary and indirect private
corporate costs. 
Direct budgetary costs are difficult to estimate, as they are inseparable from the
general costs of conducting reforms. In this study we will not estimate them. 
The major indirect budgetary cost is foregone customs revenues. Its estimation is
rather straightforward based on the tariff and trade flow data. 
Direct private corporate costs are costs of compliance with product standards.
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Their econometric estimates are quite rare. The example we reviewed – the study by
Maskus, Otsuki and Wilson (2005) – estimates the elasticity of cost with respect to a
change in the stringency of standards. The results show that a 1% increase in
investment to meet compliance costs in importing countries raises variable
production costs by between 0.06 and 0.13%; while fixed costs are estimated to be
about 4.7% of value added on average. It is unlikely that we will be able to use such a
methodology for ENP countries, primarily due to the unavailability of data. 
Another methodology - the Standard Cost Model - is used for determining
administrative costs for businesses imposed by regulations. This methodology does
not apply any econometric modeling, but calculates different costs directly based on
the cost of changes to be implemented and their frequency. The methodology is also
demanding in terms of data, so it could be difficult to apply given the limitations of
data availability for CIS countries. Its application will require making assumptions
where data is missing. 
The methodology we suggest using is based on extrapolation of the existing survey
data and findings for CEE countries. We are going to use the findings on costs of
compliance for Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Poland from the World Bank Technical
Barriers to Trade Survey and extrapolate them with some adjustments for degree of
harmonisation.
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To assess the costs and benefits of the institutional harmonisation between the EU
and its Eastern neighbors, one needs to first define what institutional harmonisation
is. In our analysis we instrumentalise this concept by looking at the context in which
the harmonisation is carried out. This context is deep trade liberalization that involves
not only elimination of tariffs, but also regulatory approximation in many areas and
close integration is some sectors. 
Based on the analysis of the experiences of the existing arrangements (EU
membership, EEA, EU-Switzerland cooperation, EU-Turkey Customs Union and
Euro-Mediterranean FTA) and also policy provisions of the ENP, we think the most
realistic and suitable institutional harmonisation package for EU Eastern neighbors
in the medium term should include: FTA in industrial products, involving full
harmonisation of product standards and regulation in EU harmonized areas and
adoption of Mutual Recognition agreement in non-harmonized areas; partial
liberalization of trade in agricultural products (in sectors that are able to comply with
EU SPS requirements); partial liberalization of trade in services; integration in EU
energy and transport networks. 
Institutional harmonisation with the EU is likely to bring a range of benefit to its
neighbors. Among them: better market access, increased investment, increased
competition and reduced corruption, all of which is likely to translate into welfare
growth. These, however, can come at a cost. The direct costs involve budgetary
expenses and enterprise expenses incurred in order to comply with new rules. There
also possible negative indirect effects that can lead to a loss of market by the currently
existing enterprises. 
Moreover, the extent to which harmonisation is going to benefit neighbors’ economies
also depends on how effectively it is carried out. Previous experiences of imposition of
new institutions in CIS countries show that harmonisation can face a range of challenges
due to peculiarities of the existing institutional setup in these countries. 
As a first stage of analyzing the benefits of institutional harmonisation, we review
the existing studies on non-tariff barriers. Estimations of NTBs give an idea of how
much benefit can be obtained if they are eliminated. Estimations of the potential
impact of Eastern EU enlargement demonstrate that access to the EU internal market
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Conclusions
and lessening of NTBs may have led to considerable aggregate trade increase for
CEES countries. Estimates for CIS countries are scarce, with the exception of
Ukraine. The survey data for Ukraine suggests that NTBs constitute a significant
barrier to trade, and abolishing or reducing them may bring about significant welfare
gains for CIS countries.  
Finally, based on our discussion of the costs of harmonisation, we think that it is
feasible (although still methodologically difficult) to estimate secondary costs
stemming from institutional harmonisation, namely, loss of tariff revenue by the state
budget and compliance costs borne by the private sector. Primary costs, that emerge
as the state institutions need to upgrade their capacity, are very difficult to separate
from the general reform effort and, thus, will not be estimated in this project. Based
on the analysis of the existing methodologies for estimating the costs of
harmonisation, we tend to conclude that the Standard Cost Model is the best available
option, although quite demanding in terms of data. 
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